xxvi EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 



Just as Agassiz employs bibliography to buttress special creation- 

 ism, so his repetition of concepts and viewpoints is constant, leaving 

 no room for doubt that his is the only valid approach to natural 

 history. The Essay proceeds from demonstration to demonstration; 

 after each part or discussion he provides a detailed recapitulation 

 of what has been said before. In addition, Agassiz supplies a summary 

 of his reasoning and beliefs in Section XXXII of the first chapter, 

 where he presents to the reader a kind of unified credo, thirty-one 

 "conclusions" representing the scientific and philosophical doctrines 

 of the entire work. To Agassiz the final meaning of all natural history 

 is that it 



exhibits not only thought, it shows also premeditation, power, wisdom, great- 

 ness, prescience, omniscience, providence. ... all these facts . . . proclaim 

 aloud the One God, whom man may know, adore, and love; and Natural His- 

 tory must, in good time, become the analysis of the thoughts of the Creator of 

 the Universe, as manifested in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, as well as 

 in the inorganic world, (p. 137) 



Such certainty of belief held by him and like-minded naturalists 

 was derived from a logic and method of science as persuasive as it 

 was comprehensive.® Of primary significance was the conception of 

 a rational plan in nature, imposed from without, and controlling 

 the existence and relationships of all organized beings. In all the 

 diversity and multiplicity of life on earth, an essential and orderly 

 unity prevailed. The aim of the naturalist must therefore be to de- 

 scribe this unity by virtue of his perception of the divine in nature. 

 In Agassiz's language there were 



fixed relations between animals, determined by thoughtful considerations. I 

 would as soon cease to believe in the existence of one God because men worship 

 Him in so many different ways ... as to distrust the evidence of my own senses 

 respecting the existence of a preestablished and duly considered system in 

 nature, the arrangement of which preceded the creation of all things that exist, 

 (p. 155) 



The purpose of systems of classification, then, was to demonstrate 

 "the manifold ties which link together all animals and plants as the 

 living expression of a gigantic conception. . . ." 



A traditional and ultimate interpretation of nature was not in 



• My discussion of Agassiz's philosophy of nature is greatly indebted to the incisive 

 appraisal by Ernst Mayr, "Agassiz, Darwin, and Evolution," Harvard Library Bulletin, 

 XIII (1959). 165-194. 



