INSECT SOCIETIES 



no more than the accomplishment of the same task by indi- 

 viduals which are all in the same physiological state. It is 

 only in the most advanced species, in ants like Oecophylla, 

 in the honey bee, and in the specialised termites that co- 

 operative behaviour can clearly be seen. 



It may seem far-fetched to suggest that all ethical systems 

 are ultimately founded on the necessities of social life. Some- 

 thing of course depends on the definition of the word ethical ; 

 if it is restricted to behaviour determined by a conscious plan 

 of action, all animals other than man would seem to be 

 excluded. It is perhaps more reasonable to regard the 

 refined forms of altruism which we consider the highest type 

 of ethical behaviour as developments from the maternal care 

 of many solitary animals, and especially from the family 

 loyalty of social species. If a bird defends her nest against 

 an enemy, her behaviour is often said to be instinctive or 

 innate and therefore no more creditable than eating a worm. 

 In the social insects, workers will defend their nest to the 

 death, and will care for young which may be only remotely 

 related to them. In human beings, on some occasions and 

 by some individuals, the whole species is treated as a family 

 to be defended or cherished. Probably very little of our 

 altruism is instinctive or even unconscious. Nevertheless, 

 the instinctive altruism of the primitive family may have 

 made the pattern from which the traditions of conscious 

 altruism were later evolved. 



Our assessment of ethical values is associated with a 

 conscience, a sense of right and wrong. In its lowest form 

 this is a desire to win the approval or to avoid the dis- 

 approval of the rest of the community. Domesticated and 

 therefore semi-social animals like the dog can be trained until 

 they have a rudimentary conscience, founded on an experi- 

 ence of rewards and punishments. 



o 205 



