APPENDIX. 71 



"So, again, in The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 564, this court, speak- 

 ing through Mr. Justice Field, said: 



" 'There is undoubtedly an internal commerce which is subject to 

 the control of the States. The power delegated to Congress is 

 limited to commerce 'among the several States,' with foreign nations 

 and with Indian tribes. This limitation necessarily excludes from 

 the Federal control, commerce not thus designated, and of course that 

 commerce which is carried on entirely within the limits of a State 

 and does not extend to or affect other States.' 



"The fact that internal commerce may be distinct from interstate 

 commerce, destroys the whole theory upon which the argument of the 

 plaintiff in error proceeds. The power of the State to control the 

 killing of and ownership in game being admitted, the commerce in 

 game which the State law permitted, was necessarily only internal 

 commerce, since the restriction that it should not become the subject 

 of external commerce went along with the grant and was a part of it. 

 All ownership in game killed within the State came under this con- 

 dition, which the State had the lawful authority to impose, and no 

 contracts made in relation to such property were exempt from the 

 law of the State consenting that such contracts be made, provided 

 only they were confined to internal and did not extend to external 

 commerce. 



"The case in this respect is identical with Kidd v. Pearson, 128 

 U. S. 1. The facts there considered were briefly as follows: The 

 State of Iowa permitted the distillation of intoxicating liquors for 

 'mechanical, medicinal, culinary and sacramental purposes.' The 

 right was asserted to send out of the State intoxicating liquors made 

 therein on the ground that, when manufactured in the State, such 

 liquors became the subject of interstate commerce, and were thus 

 protected by the Constitution of the United States; but this court, 

 through Mr. Justice Lamar, pointed out the vice in the reasoning, 

 which consisted in presupposing that the State had authorized the 

 manufacture of intoxicants, thereby overlooking the exceptional pur- 

 pose for which alone such manufacture was permitted. So here the 



