8o THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY, 



Bellingham's case, an absence of knowledge of right and wrong gen- 

 erally, not in respect of the particular act, was deemed necessary to 

 exempt the individual from punishment ; the latter theory being en- 

 tirely inconsistent with the former, and neither of them being consist- 

 ently acted upon in subsequent trials. Most often a knowledge of 

 rio'ht and wrong, without reference to the particular act, was plainly 

 declared by the judge to be the simple and sufficient criterion of re- 

 sponsibility, and the jury was instructed accordingly ; but this crite- 

 rion was sometimes modified by the qualifications which judges intro- 

 duced to meet their individual views, or to prevent the conviction of a 

 person who was plainly insane and irresponsible. There was no settled 

 principle, no actual uniformity of practice, no certainty of result. 



In this uncertain way matters went on until a great sensation was 

 made by the murder, in 1843, of Mr. Drummond by MclSTaughten, 

 who shot him under the influence of a delusion that he was one of a 

 number of persons whom he believed to be following him everywhere, 

 blasting his character and making his life wretched. McNaughten 

 had transacted business a short time before the deed, and had shown 

 no obvious symptoms of insanity in his ordinary discourse and con- 

 duct. He was, however, acquitted on the ground of insanity. There- 

 upon the House of Lords, participating in the public alarm and indig- 

 nation which were occasioned by the acquittal, propounded to the 

 judges certain questions with regard to the law on the subject of in- 

 sanity when it was alleged as a defense in criminal actions ; the ob- 

 ject being to obtain from them an authoritative exposition of the law 

 for the future guidance of courts. The answers of the judges to the 

 questions thus put to them constitute the law of England as it has 

 been applied since to the defense of insanity in criminal trials. 



It is not necessary to quote the questions and answers at length ; 

 the latter are somewhat confused, and the substance of them may be 

 correctly given in fewer words. " To establish a defense on the ground 

 of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the 

 act the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from 

 disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act 

 he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing 

 what was wrong." It will not escape attention that the question of 

 right and wrong in the abstract was here abandoned, being allowed 

 quietly to go the way of the wild-beast form of the knowledge-test ; 

 the question of right and wrong was to be put in reference to the par- 



unable to discern the essential identity of nature between a particular crime and all 

 other crimes, whereby they are led to approve what, in general terms, they have already 

 condemned. It is a fact, not calculated to increase our faith in the 'march of intellect,' 

 that the very trait peculiarly characteristic of insanity has been seized upon as a con- 

 elusive proof of sanity in doubtful cases ; and thus the infirmity that entitles one to pro- 

 tection, is tortured into a good and sufficient reason for completing his ruin." — (" A Trea- 

 tise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity," fifth edition, pp. 26-28.) 



