146 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



Let us analyze this " authoritative expression." It contains several 

 startling implications, the disclosure of which the reader will find not 

 uninteresting. Consider, first, what is implied by framing the thought 

 that " the properties of matter might have been such as to render a 

 totally different set of laws axiomatic." I will not stop to make the 

 inquiry whether matter, having properties fundamentally unlike its 

 present ones, can be conceived ; though such an inquiry, leading to 

 the conclusion that no conception of the kind is possible, would show 

 that the proposition is merely a verbal one. It will suffice if I examine 

 the nature of this proposition that " the properties of matter might 

 have 5ee?i" other than they are. Does it express an experimentally- 

 ascertained truth ? If so, I invite Prof. Tait to describe the experi- 

 ments. Is it an intuition ? If so, then, along with doubt of an intui- 

 tive belief concerning things as they are^ there goes confidence in an 

 intuitive belief concerning things as they are not. Is it an hypothesis ? 

 If so, the implication is that a cognition of which the negation is in- 

 conceivable (for an axiom is such) may be discredited by inference 

 from that which is not a cognition at all, but simply a supposition. 

 Does the reviewer admit that no conclusion can have a validity greater 

 than is possessed by its premises ? or will he say that the trustworthiness 

 of cognitions increases in proportion as they are the more inferential? 

 Be his answer what it may, I shall take it as unquestionable that nothing 

 concluded can have a warrant higher than that from which it is con- 

 cluded, though it may have a lower. Now, the elements of the propo- 

 sition before us are these : As " the properties of matter might have 

 been such as to render a totally different set of laws axiomatic " (there- 

 fore) " these laws [now in force] must be considered as resting .... 

 not on intuitive perception : " that is, the intuitions in which these 

 laws are recognized must not be held authoritative. Here the cogni- 

 tion posited as premiss is, that the properties of the matter might have 

 been other than they are ; and the conclusion is that our intuitions 

 relative to existing properties are uncertain. Hence, if this conclusion 

 is valid, it is valid because the cognition or intuition respecting what 

 might have been is more trustworthy than the cognition or intuition 

 respecting what is ! Skepticism respecting the deliverances of con- 

 sciousness about things as they are is based upon faith in a deliverance 

 of consciousness about things as they are not ! 



I go on to remark that this " authoritative expression of disapprov- 

 al" by which I am supposed to be silenced, even were its allegation 

 as valid as it is fallacious, v/ould leave wholly untouched the real issue. 

 I pointed out how Prof. Tait's denial, that any physical truths could 

 be reached a priori, was contradicted by his own statement respecting 

 physical axioms. The question thus raised the reviewer evades, and 

 substitutes another with which I have just dealt. Kow I bring for- 

 ward again the evaded question. 



In the passage I quoted, Prof. Tait, besides speaking of physical 



