320 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



analysis of minerals, of geology to the classification of the earth's 

 strata, or of astronomy to the calculation of the motions and relations 

 of the heavenly bodies. 



Nor is there any more mystery in one than in the other. Of 

 course, in biology, the process is more complicated — more difficult to 

 comprehend — but not incomprehensible. Indeed, as will be seen at the 

 proper time, the mysteries of daily occurrence, such as growth, bud- 

 ding, and reproduction, are as great as any which beset the passage 

 from form to form, from species to species. No one who has thought 

 of it sufficiently can deny that the ordinary facts of generation, as the 

 necessity of the union of two cells of nearly-spent vitality to produce 

 a third cell, or a brood of cells, endowed with primeval vigor, present 

 difficulties more unsurpassable than the origin of the germs of living 

 things from inorganic matter; or tbat the preservation of species, by 

 like producing like, is more difficult of explanation than the beginning 

 of new species by variations in the reproduction, which, as a fact, is 

 more likely to occur than the resemblance. The genesis of life from 

 the inorganic kingdom we can begin to comprehend, because it is more 

 simple and can be referred to known physical forces ; but the other 

 — that is, reproduction — is still wrapped in impenetrable obscurity. 



A glance at the history of this controversy will make the whole 

 matter clear, and, as remarked, ought to set us right with the rest of 

 the world. 



In the dawn of science as we know it — that is to say, in the rise 

 of the Greek philosophy — no other view of creation was thought of 

 than that which modern induction now demands, because, happily for 

 them, there was not in their possession any supposed revelation on 

 the subject, and there was no school which thought of any other solu- 

 tion of the problem than one which could be deduced from observa- 

 tion and speculation. Yet they suggested little that would now be 

 of benefit, the range of their facts and of their analysis being too 

 much limited. 



The moderns, notwithstanding that the general principles of the 

 philosophy, and of the philosophical theology of the middle ages were, 

 as we have seen, favorable, have cramped and trammeled themselves 

 with many irrelevant matters. The so-called skeptics are not alone 

 to blame for the unnecessary conflict existing between Religion and 

 Science. In the great religious revolutions of the sixteenth century 

 (incident to revolutions in empire and commerce), from the excitement 

 of religious parties theology and polemics assumed the lead in literature 

 and thought. And such was the increased importance given to indi- 

 vidual opinion, arguments, and scholarship, that it is often difficult to 

 separate the idiosyncrasies of the author from the general cause he 

 advocated. In their appeals to history as the principal method of 

 discussing divinity, it was natural that each scholar should, consciously 

 or unconsciously, adopt some scheme of universal history ; and it was 



