THE CHAIN OF SPECIES. 461 



not to be jumped at by mere speculation, nor by hasty inference from 

 the sparse and ill-digested facts of natural history now in our posses- 

 sion. The full solution of the mystery still lies in the future, and is to 

 be reached only after the collection and comparison of a mass of data 

 overwhelming to contemplate. In the mean time, confusion of ideas 

 and differences about words characterize all our controversies. How 

 men will misunderstand one another ! 



" We have an idea, make a word. 

 Too false t' unite us, or control ; 

 And for the word itself we fight 



In bitterness of soul." — Woedsworth. 



It is usual to state that there are two theories of the origin of spe- 

 cies, of the production of organic forms, namely, the theory of special 

 creations, and the theory of natural selection. But the statement 

 stands in need of criticism. The supposition of a special genesis, 

 ■whether by some assumed ab extra influence, in other words, miracu- 

 lous interference, or by some influence working ab intra, is a virtual 

 begging of the question, a virtual admission that we never can follow 

 the chain of causation. And this, because at some stage of the pro- 

 cess the battle is to be stopped ; at some step of the argument our 

 mouths are to be shut, if not with a miracle after the manner of the 

 Sunday-school teachers, which has at least the merit of piety about it, 

 then with the more formidable obstruction of an inexplicable fact or 

 property. And we are actually told, by one of this turn of thinking, 

 that " to bother ourselves about these inexplicable facts is as irrational 

 as to discuss the politics of the moon." 



But, leaving special genesis aside, let us consider a little more 

 closely the doctrine of natural selection. This, in fact, is not a theory 

 of the origin — of the genesis of species. As M. Quatrefages has re- 

 marked, it is not a theory at all, for it explains nothing, accounts for 

 nothing, and is not therefore truly an hypothesis in philosophy. 

 Natural selection is not a cause, but the discussion of it draws atten- 

 tion to the chain of causes at the bottom of which we must look for 

 the solution of our problem. As we all know, it is a notion taken 

 from the selection exercised by the hand of man in the rearing of do- 

 mestic plants and animals. Man, by the conscious or unconscious 

 selection of that which best suited his wants or caprices, has educed 

 and displayed many varieties of living creatures ; and in like manner 

 it is suggested that Nature, by holding on to the fittest in the struggle 

 for life, has herself made selection of the innumerable forms we see. 

 In a general way, this principle has always been recognized ; and in 

 past ages it has been always remarked that the varieties discovered 

 are well adapted to exist, and that, if they were not so adapted, they 

 would perish. But we have yet to see that these variations are always 

 the fittest, or that the fittest comparatively always survive. 



