6oo THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



It will have been seen, in the above description of universal phe- 

 nomena, that a purely abstract mode of treatment has been adopted. 

 So far as universally confessed historical facts are presupposed, the 

 truth of such facts is boldly assumed. But the main basis of the 

 arguments are the elements of human nature itself, as they are written, 

 not only in the venerable documents of ancient history, but on the 

 face of every traveler's narrative, of every ancient body of laws, of 

 every honored institution subsisting in the midst of the national life 

 of the most advanced countries of Europe. It is obvious, then, that 

 the generality and permanence of the momentous facts above described 

 afford the groundwork of a great science, the Science of Law. 



This science is distinguishable from the Science of Ethics, to which 

 it may be coordinated, as well as from the Science of Politics, to 

 which it is subordinated. The materials of the science are : a descrip- 

 tion of — 1. The essential institutions of human society, by the use of 

 which the objects of that society are carried out through the medium 

 of government ; 2. The nature, conditions, and limits of law as an 

 expression of that side of governmental action which consists in the 

 enumeration of general rules of action ; 3. The accidents of law, such 

 as language and interpretation, terminology, and devices for legis- 

 lation. 



When these materials are carefully scrutinized, it will be found 

 that they are composed of elements as permanent and universal as the 

 elements of human nature itself. All that is arbitrary and idiosyncrat- 

 ic for any particular state is banished from the inquiry. The surplus 

 is as applicable to one state as to another; to the most immature sys- 

 tem of law as to the most advanced; to an Eastern as to a "Western 

 community ; to the modern as to the ancient world. 



It is curious that this universality and permanence have been gen- 

 erally conceded to ethical truths, and have latterly been more and more 

 freely conceded even to political phenomena, modified indefinitely, as 

 these must needs be, by the excessive complexity of the conditions 

 which constitute them. But the region of law has, up to a recent time, 

 been held to be the natural home of caprice and irregularity. Some 

 writers, indeed, such as Montesquieu and M. Charles Comte, have 

 quoted the varying laws in the different countries of the world with 

 almost an ironical gladness at their bizarre and party-colored appear- 

 ance. It has been very generally held that governments have been 

 created by violence or accident, and have reflected the vices of their 

 origin in the reckless selfishness of their legislation. It has been said 

 again and again that force is the origin of all social institutions, and 

 that the modes of directing that force have been determined in every 

 state by the chance breath of political caprice or passion. It has been 

 forgotten, or has escaped notice, that the caprice has been accidental 

 and the order is essential. 



It will be noticed that there are two distinct conceptions of human 



