MATERIALS OF THE SCIENCE OF LAW. 601 



society which are both possible, if not both true, and that the existence 

 of a Science of Law follows as a necessary consequence of the adop- 

 tion of one conception, but does not follow from the adoption of the 

 other. It may be said, on one theory, that the composition and action 

 of human society, as exhibited in the state, are due to nothing else than 

 the aggregation and mutual repulsion of a number of independent and 

 self-conscious atoms which, by a gradual process of experience, have 

 discovered that the largest measure of individual well-being is solely 

 attainable through certain special modes of cooperation. These modes 

 of cooperation take a variety of forms, but the most signal and impor- 

 tant are those implied in the facts of government, ownership, the com- 

 position of the family, and contract. 



According to the theory now under review, every one of these facts 

 is merely a device for carrying out ends believed to be beneficial. The 

 facts might be made to vary indefinitely, and it is alleged to be con- 

 ceivable that any one of them, and perhaps every one, might be absent 

 altogether and a new set of devices take their place. It is held to be 

 possible that the devices themselves will, at no remote period, be dis- 

 covered to be rude and iDSufficient, and that many superior substitutes 

 could be found for them, even if they do not already exist in certain 

 societies, the constitution of which is as yet unexplored. The ma- 

 chinery by which each one of these classes of facts is called into being, 

 and made to subserve its end, is physical force, taking the form of what 

 is called law. The physically stronger part of the community compels 

 the weaker to obey a certain form of governing authority, to recog- 

 nize certain descriptions of ownership, to conform their lives to certain 

 canons of domestic life, and to observe certain regulations of the mar- 

 ket and the exchange. The rules, indeed, enforced by law are, for the 

 most part, so transparently beneficial to all concerned that the press- 

 ure of law becomes very slightly felt, and the physical force which 

 supports it is comparatively seldom called into play. Nevertheless, 

 in the theory now being enunciated, force is not only present, but the 

 main originator and upholder of every portion of the fabric of social 

 order. It is obvious that, according to this view, there can only be a 

 Science of Law in a very restricted sense. In the largest sense of the 

 expression there can be none. Instead of law having any precise and 

 determined character impressed upon it and upon its operation, through 

 the existence of a certain number of immovable social institutions, 

 which react back as effectually upon law as law acts upon them, these 

 institutions are nothing more than the creations of law itself, or rather 

 the accidental shadows which law happens to cast. 



The opposite theory of society starts with the conception that so- 

 ciety is not developed through the conflicting passions of individual 

 atoms strivino: to orojanize themselves after a fashion which shall best 

 promote their own well-being, but is from first to last a subsisting 

 organization made up of constituent groups reciprocally acting and 



