6o4 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY, 



cision, opportunity is presented for all sorts of logical conflict as to the 

 import of the previous cases cited in illustration, or as to the value of 

 the analogies insisted upon. 



In other words, a series of logical processes is involved in the in- 

 terpretation of every law, whether written or unwritten, and the cor- 

 rectness of these processes may furnish ground for indefinite doubt and 

 argument. But these logical processes are permanent and universal, 

 and the application of them to the interpretation of law imj)arts their 

 own permanence and universality to the Science of Law. 



It has thus been seen that the intellectual and the ethical nature of 

 man in all nations tends to impart a scientific character to the study 

 of the laws by which his social actions are regulated. The physical 

 facts of his life and bodily constitution tend to the same end. His 

 birth, his death, his age, his liability to diseases and accidents of all 

 sorts, his capacity of locomotion, and his several relations to time, 

 space, quantity, measurement, and the like, further discover fresh cate- 

 gories into which portions of the laws which regulate his conduct, and 

 describe his situation, under varying circumstances, in relation to his 

 fellows, necessarily fall. 



Besides the elements of the Science of Law which are discoverable 

 within the limits of a single state, and even of the most miniature one, 

 there are others which are developed only in the course of time, as 

 states multiply in number, and as their relations to one another become 

 strictly defined. 



The relations of states to one another are twofold in character. 

 Either the governments of the different states have relations to each 

 other, or the individual citizens of the different states have relations 

 to each other. 



The first class of relations gives occasion to what is called Public 

 International Law, and the latter to what is sometimes called, with 

 less precision. Private International Law. 



It is plain that, if the rules regulating the relations of states are true 

 law in any sense, they are identical for all the states subject to them. 

 The same ought to be the case with respect to the rules regulating the 

 recosfnition of the laws of foreis^n states. But there are certain obsta- 

 cles which have, in fact, prevented the uniformity of substance which 

 might have been anticipated in this region of law. 



The rules of the species of law last indicated come into being 

 through the moral claim that is presented either by persons who, not 

 being citizens of a given country, come to the courts of justice of that 

 country, while sojourning there, to have rights recognized and pro- 

 tected which they have acquired in their own country; or by those 

 who, being citizens of one country, but having acquired rights while 

 sojourning in other countries, come to the courts of their own country 

 to have those rights recognized and protected. 



On every occasion for inventing rules applicable to these cases, the 



