202 ORIGINAL ARTICLES. 



therefore, cannot be a product of the Material Organism — " II ne pense 

 pas — y a-t-il une preuve plus evidente que la matiere seule, quoique par- 

 faitement organisee, ne peut produire, ni la pensee, ni la parole qui en 

 est la signe, a moins qu' ellene soit animee par un principe superieur ?" 



The modern Idealist may avoid his predecessors' anatomical errors ; 

 but, if he be true to his principles, he will feel no anxiety to repudiate 

 their metaphysics. He may make his strong position yet stronger, we 

 believe, by adducing biological evidence in disproof of the usually 

 granted assumption, that mental capacity stands always in a certain re- 

 lation to cerebral development ; but holding, as he does, the existence 

 of an essential difference between mind and matter, he makes himself 

 but a materialist for the nonce, if he express any repugnance to such 

 statements as those just quoted on account of any conclusions to which 

 they could lead Mm. For even if they were wholly, as we believe they 

 are nearly, true to the facts, he could draw from them, if he remained 

 true to his principles, no other conclusions than did Buffon and Tyson. 



Reasoners of the kind to which we allude will do well to imitate the 

 logical consistency of the materialistic author of the " Icones Cerebri 

 Simiarum." Tiedemann, at all events, had no half-hearted faith in his 

 creed. He plights his faith to the scalpel and callipers, and betrays no 

 anxiety as to any possible upsetting of his conclusion by such data as 

 consciousness or the history of psychical phenomena could furnish — 

 " Parvus* 4 ergo encephalus Orang IJtangi rationem physicum et certam 

 prodit ubi jam celeberrimus Soemerring monuit cur animi facultatibus 

 tantopere ab homine distet. In homine prsevalere cerebrum summum- 

 que hominis bonum rationis usum, ab ipsa maxima encephali evolutione 

 pendere haud dubitari potest. Praecipua et essentialis ergo differentia 

 quae ipsum hominem et reliqua animantia intercedit in cerebro posita 

 est." 



Having indicated our opinion that the dealing with such views as 

 those just quoted from Tiedemann's thirty-second Corollary is to be safely, 

 though by no means of necessity, delegated to the metaphysician, we 

 may proceed forthwith to lay before the reader the anatomical details 

 which will enable him to decide for himself, whether the Heidelberg 

 anatomist, or the French natural historian, was the nearer the truth in a 

 matter of fact. 



Multitudinous as are the differences which a detailed comparison of 

 any two brains will disclose, they yet admit of being arranged under 

 four heads. Under the first of these heads we may class those differences, 

 which the observant anatomical eye would detect without the assistance 

 of any anatomical instrument, and could express without being necessi- 

 tated to employ any technical anatomical language. 



Our second class of differences comprehends such as the scales and 

 the callipers reveal. 



For the power of describing, and one might almost say, for the 



* Icones, Cor. xxxii , p. 54. 



