748 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



The view of science upon this question is widely different. Of 

 eternal fires, which serve at once to torture the skeptic and heighten 

 the felicity of the saint, it knows nothing ; the belief in them belongs 

 rather to those cherished mysteries of faith which lie far beyond its 

 scope. In that functional activity we call mind, it recognizes no power 

 to originate uncaused volition. The universe is subject to law. No- 

 thing ever happens or comes to pass without a cause. The cause 

 determines the event, so that it could not be otherwise. What deter- 

 mines volition ? Motives, The will is always determined by the 

 strongest motive. 



Given the motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given like- 

 wise the character and dispositioti of the individual, his actions might unerringly 

 be inferred. — John Stuart Mill. 



The conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and 

 uniform as that between the cause and elfect in any part of Nature. — Hume. 



The only meaning of the law of causation in the physical world is, that it 

 generalizes universal experience of the order of that world ; and, if experience 

 shows a similar order to obtain among states of consciousness, the law of causa- 

 tion will properly express that order. That such an order exists is acknowledged 

 by every sane man. — Huxley. 



It is claimed, however, that consciousness asserts itself with decisive 

 force in favor of free-will. Is this true ? "I dispute altogether," 

 says Mill, " that we are conscious of being able to act in opposition to 

 the strongest desire or aversion." But this is a point which we are 

 all able to investigate for ourselves. Indeed, the peculiar advantage 

 of metaphysical study is the opportunity universally possessed of test- 

 ing theory by observation, in watching the operations of our own 

 minds. I propose, therefore, to go directly upon the ground assumed 

 as their own by the advocates of free-will, and rest the proof of causa- 

 tion upon the uniform testimony of consciousness. It seems to me 

 that the evidence in favor of the scientific view is so cumulative and 

 convincing that a reasonable being, capable of comprehending the 

 problem, and unbiased by dogma, could, after its consideration, more 

 easily assert his intangibility than his liberty of volition. 



If we define the will as that " by which the mind chooses any- 

 thing," and an act of the will as an act of choosing or choice between 

 two or more courses of conduct, or between action and inaction, it is 

 evident that by far the greater portion of our acts occur without con- 

 scious exercise of this faculty. Walking along a muddy street, engaged 

 in deep thought or earnest conversation with a friend, one picks his 

 way, but consciously does not determine where at each step his foot is 

 to be placed. We laugh when amused ; weep from sympathy or 

 grief ; cry from pain ; become agitated, irritable, excited, or angry, if 

 sufficiently vexed, without previous choice whether or not we shall 

 yield to these emotions. We speak of ourselves as acting " from the 

 impulse of the moment," from habit, or " a§ we always do under such 



