THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECT OF '' FREE-WILL^ 749 



circumstances." Let any one, for instance, review in his mind the 

 events of yesterday, from the first moment of awakened consciousness 

 until he sank into slumber at night, and remembei', if he can, before how 

 many of the ten thousand actions which constituted his daily life he 

 paused to choose. Awakened in the morning, he arose, doubtless, at 

 his usual hour — performed ablution, assumed his garments, one by 

 one, in a certain methodical order, and descended to breakfast. He 

 read portions of his newspaper ; commented on events or politics ; the 

 coffee was burned and the steak tough, and he Avas irritable and mo- 

 rose ; or both were excellent, and he was amiable and talkative. He 

 walked to his place of business by the route he always takes ; crossing 

 the streets where he had crossed a thousand times previously ; arriving 

 at the usual hour, notwithstanding he might have made — had the mo- 

 tives existed — innumerable variations from his regular course in each 

 of these proceedings. Now, up to this point, he has probably per- 

 formed several thousand distinct muscular efforts, each under the con- 

 trol of his will — from the glance of an eye to the propulsion of his 

 body along the street. How many of them can he remember, or does 

 he suppose to have resulted from conscious choice between action as 

 performed and another imaginable possible alternative ? Probably he 

 could count on his fingers all the acts of conscious choice performed 

 during the entire day. The rest have been as instinctive and impul- 

 sive, as unconsciously determined by circumstances, as the operations 

 of ordinary animal existence. 



Turning now to the consideration of those acts which are preceded 

 by that conscious weighing of motives which constitutes true volition, 

 we shall find these no less determined by law. Appealing confidently 

 to the consciousness of every reader, I submit that tee not only inva- 

 riably choose, but ice cax oxly choose, that object or course of action 

 xohich at the instant, the loill is exercised to choose, appears to us, all 

 things considered, the most desirable. 



This can hardly be doubted. For the very act of conscious choice 

 implies of necessity (except in those imaginary cases of absolute in- 

 difference wherein morality can not be concerned) a preference, even 

 if it be only momentary. Mind, I do not say the thing chosen is really 

 desirable ; perhaps the only courses open are all very undesirable, ter- 

 rible, full of painful consequences, and the confused mind may pass 

 from one to another with a hesitating tr<3mulousness of indecision — 

 obliged, however, ultimately to make a choice. Put yourself to any 

 fair test, and see if you can possibly choose that which you prefer least 

 to choose. Pain is exceedingly undesirable, is it not ? Take a needle 

 and place the point against your bared arm ; now choose whether or 

 not you shall force it to enter your flesh. " But it will hurt me," you 

 say, and you throw down the needle, proceeding no further. Do you 

 so decide without cause ? Or perhaps you push the point beneath the 

 skin, and inflict upon yourself pain, without apparent adequate motive. 



