752 



THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



can we imagine a Universalist clergyman so suffering for such results ? 

 How largely also are our notions of right and wrong determined for 

 us by early parental training ! A landlady of mine, in Leipsic, a pas- 

 tor's daughter, of the most rigid type of Protestant orthodoxy, at- 

 tended church one Sunday morning, and a representation of " Faust " 

 at the theatre the same evening ; and saw no incongruity in a course 

 which, by a majority of people in this country, would be regarded as 

 a fearful sin. Both views of Sunday are merely results of religious 

 education at a period when the mind is jjeculiarly receptive, and 

 when no one claims that a child should decide as to the correctness of 

 the opinions taught. These are only a few out of the infinite num- 

 ber of circumstances, beyond individual control, which decide what 

 shall be the views we take of the qualities of things and the desir- 

 ableness of action. They mold character ; they shape opinions ; they 

 make the man what he is. Since by these facts of organization, edu- 

 cation, religious training, social position, etc., indej^endent of our wish 

 or will, are determined for us the vie us we invariably take of the ap- 

 parent desirableness of all objects or actions — since upon this apparent 

 desirableness the choice of conduct of mankind invariably depends — 

 it follows that the human will is as subject to the law of causation as 

 the movements of the planets or the flight of an insect in the air. 



It is asserted, however, by the advocates of the popular doctrine, 

 that the scientific negation of free-will obliterates what is called 

 "moral responsibility," and places man, as respects his actions, on the 

 plane of other animals. A full consideration of this point would lead 

 us too far aside from our subject ; yet, were all imagined consequences 

 sure to arise from general disbelief in accountability for action, I fail 

 to see how this proves the truth of the doctrine of free-will. It can 

 never be too often repeated that, regarding each and every theory, dog- 

 ma, or proposition. Science can ask but one question, Is it true f The 

 answer must come from other sources than the imagined sequence of 

 its acceptance or rejection. But let us suppose that mankind should 

 some day admit the proposition that moral responsibility, in the theo- 

 logical sense, does not exist ; that the will is determined by the strong- 

 est motive : what fearful results would ensue ! Would punishment 

 cease to follow crime ? On the contrary, its use would never be more 

 logical. If the stronger motive has led an individual to transgress the 

 rights of society, then society must punish for three reasons : 1, That 

 the memory of the punishment may act as a strong motive in deterring 

 from future repetition of the offense ; 2. That the example may deter 

 others ; and, 3. That society may be protected from a dangerous man. 

 These reasons are all consistent with the doctrine of necessity ; what 

 others would the advocates of uncaused volition add ? To assert that 

 punishment should only be inflicted where " moral responsibility " ex- 

 ists, is either to confer it upon our domestic animals, or else to deny 

 the justice of our every-day action regarding them. A child throws 



