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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



men living entirely for the future. The source of the feeling called 

 moral obligation is now indicated. The essential trait being the con- 

 trol of some feelings by some other feelings, Mr. Spencer traces the 

 different species of control from without, in political govei-nment, re- 

 ligious fear, and the general influence of society. All these have 

 evolved with society, as means of social self-preservation. The pen- 

 alties accompanying them impart the feeling of coercion ; in other 

 words, the sense of moral obligation. At the same time we are not to 

 exclude from the aggregate the earlier and deeper element of self- 

 regarding prudence^ based on the penalties of improvidence. But now 

 the moral motive, arising at first from external sources, is destined to 

 transformation when the individual mind is completely accommodated 

 to the social situation. The higher actions required for the harmo- 

 nious carrying on of life will be as much matters of course as are those 

 lower actions prompted by the simple desires. 



The Sociological view, already implied, is the sujjplement of the 

 physical, the biological, and the psychological views. It teaches the 

 modes of conduct for reducing individual antagonisms, and bringing 

 about mutual cooperation. Out of this, by necessary deduction, we 

 obtain the reasons for fulfilling contracts, for assigning benefits in pro- 

 portion to services, which is Justice ; and further for the rendering of 

 gratuitous services, in a certain degree, which is Beneficence. We see 

 how social life is furthered, not merely by mutual abstinence from 

 harm, but by exchange of services beyond agreement. 



In a separate chapter, entitled " Criticisms and Exj^lanations," Mr. 

 Spencer compares his deductive theory of conduct with the utilitarian 

 computation, as handled by Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick. I will re- 

 turn to this on completing the survey of his entire scheme. His next 

 chapter is an illustration of the dependence of pleasures and pains on 

 the state of the organism, and is equally necessary for his purpose, as 

 being the completion of the theory of pleasure. People have often 

 supposed that pleasurable agents, such as sugar to the taste, are so by 

 intrinsic and absolute quality, the same to all persons in all situations. 

 This is soon shown to be a mistake ; and the opposite truth is one of 

 great importance in the ethical point of view. Physical pain is im- 

 mensely greater in a highly developed nervous system. Exercises that 

 give great pleasure to some creatures give none to others ; the system 

 being in the one case adapted to them, and in the others not. Emo- 

 tions presuppose a suitable organization. Destructiveness will give 

 way to amity, if the nervous arrangements for one are atrophied by 

 disuse, and those for the other persistently exercised. The civilized 

 man is distinguished by contracting the same delight in peaceful in- 

 dustry as the savage feels in war and the chase. 



The next two chapters — " Egoism versus Altruism " and " Altruism 

 versus Egoism " — are the most incisive in the whole book. The rela- 

 tion of altruism to egoism is subject to habitual exaggeration even to 



