3i6 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



lead, to a resuscitation of its spirit in the minds of Christians : the op- 

 posite would be nearer the truth. 



The last branch of the argument for free thought is constituted by 

 Mill's favorite doctrine that conflicting doctrines usually share the truth 

 between them. This view is, I think, both precarious in itself, and of 

 very doubtful relevance to the author's main thesis. The example from 

 the two state parties — the party of order and the party of progress — 

 will not stand a severe scrutiny. Not to mention, what he admits, 

 that there is perfect freedom of discussion on the matter, the war of 

 parties is, in point of fact, scarcely conducted according to his ideal. 

 More to the point is the well-known passage on Christian morality, 

 which he regards as a series of half-truths, needing to be made up by 

 truths derived from other sources. As far as his main purpose is con- 

 cerned, I think all this belongs to the first branch of the argument, 

 and might have been included there : that first branch containing, 

 to my mind, the real strength of the contention for freedom of 

 thought. 



The second half of the book is on liberty of conduct, as against the 

 restraints of our social customs. This is introduced by a chapter on in- 

 dividuality, considered as one of the elements of well-being. Excellent 

 as are many of the author's remarks, there are various openings for 

 criticism. The chief thing that strikes me is the want of a steady view 

 of the essentials of human happiness. I shall have to notice again the 

 defects of Mill's Hedonic philosophy, I think that he greatly exag- 

 gerates the differences between human beings as regards the conditions 

 of happiness. The community of structure in our corporeal and men- 

 tal framework far exceeds the disparities : there are certain easily 

 stated requisites, in the possession of which no one could be very 

 unhappy ; while the specialties needed to impart to a given individual 

 the highest degree of felicity are seldomer withheld by the tyranny 

 of custom than by causes that society can not control. Mill pleads 

 strongly for the energetic natures, for the exuberance of spontaneity 

 and strong impulses. But energy as sucli is not thwarted ; and the 

 difficulty will always remain, that superabundant energy is exceedingly 

 apt to trench upon other people's rights. Mill too closely identifies 

 energy with originality or genius, and genius with eccentricity. In 

 regard to all these characteristics, many fine distinctions need to be 

 drawn, over and above what Mill gives us. When he talks of the pres- 

 ent state of Englishmen as a state of collective greatness and diminish- 

 ing individuality, it takes a little reflection to see what he is driving at. 

 Nor is his reference of the unprogressiveness of the East to the despot- 

 ism of custom a wholly satisfactory explanation ; the laroblem of sta- 

 tionary societies is still undecided. 



The chapter following, entitled " The Limits to the Authority of 

 Society over the Individual," helps us better to his real meaning. He 

 lays it down as an axiom that society should interfere only in what 



