A CONSIDERATION OF SUICIDE. 801 



acceptance of the condition would not have insured him condemnation, 

 but apotheosis. 



It becomes clear, then, that suicide is sometimes not only justifiable 

 but praiseworthy ; and men make that justification or jDraise dependent 

 upon the motive with which life is surrendered. To determine whether 

 the voluntary termination of life is reprehensible or laudable, an answer 

 must first be given to the question whether the act is selfish or unselfish, 

 whether the motive is egoistic or altruistic. If the object is to save 

 others from suffering, the act is justifiable. If the object is mei-ely to 

 save one's self from suffering, the act is unjustifiable. 



This distinction between motives seems to be the true one, whether 

 we look at suicide from the purely moral or from the religious and 

 Christian standpoint. Take the Christian apothegm, " Greater love 

 hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friend," or, 

 to put it still more tersely, " The greatest love is shown by altruistic _ 

 suicide," and discover, if you can, where the line is to be drawn. Does 

 it mean that a man should lay down his life only when, by so doing, 

 he saves the lives of others ? Then he may not submit to death, though 

 by so doing he saves millions from slavery — nay, though by so doing 

 he saves a world from slavery. Then he may not abandon life, though 

 by that act he rescues others from eternal agony. Then he must not 

 prefer death to dishonor, but dishonor to death. Then he must hold 

 his own life as more valuable than the welfare of his race. If a prom- 

 ise were made, with the certainty of fulfillment, that should any human 

 being voluntarily submit to death pain would disappear from the world, 

 do you think that he who should give his life in exchange for the hap- 

 piness of a world would be branded with the mark of crime ? 



But, if we take the next step and assert that there are other motives, 

 besides the wish to save the lives of others, which will justify a man 

 in voluntarily terminating his own life, where shall we draw the line ? 

 If a man may die for the happiness of a world, may he die for the 

 happiness of a million ? If he may die for the happiness of a million, 

 may he die for the happiness of a thousand ? If he may die for the 

 happiness of a thousand, may he die for the happiness of ten ? If he 

 may die for the hapjDiness of ten, may he die for the happiness of one ? 

 At what point does the happiness of others accumulate to such an ex- 

 tent as to exceed in value a human life ? 



Let us suppose a case — one of which experience furnishes numerous 

 examples : A man, thi*ough some misfortune, finds himself wrecked 

 and shattered in body ; transformed into a living fixture. He can no 

 longer support himself. He becomes a burden for some one to carry. 

 If he is sure that the burden is borne willingly, he may consent to live. 

 But suppose that the shoulders of the bearer ache, and that when death 

 lifts the burden from him he draws a sigh of relief. May not the 

 burden itself provide the way of escape and throw itself from the 

 shoulders of its unwilling bearer to the shoulders of death ? Or, take 



