CORRESP ONDENCE. 



843 



©ovtres^joudcucje. 



"DO ANIilALS REASON?" 



Dr. Edward Thorxdike's interest- 

 ing account, in our August number, of 

 his investigations touching the reasoning 

 power of animals has brought us a large 

 number of letters questioning some of 

 the main conclusions set forth in the ar- 

 ticle, and criticising the method of the 

 inquiry. Not having room for all these 

 communications, we print one of them, 

 and add extracts from two others. These 

 represent the principal objections urged 

 by the various writers against the con- 

 clusions drawn by the author of the ar- 

 ticle from his experiments. 



Editor Popular Science Monthly : 



Sir: The first reading of Dr. Thorn- 

 dike's article Do Animals Reason? in 

 the August Popular Science Monthly, 

 gave the impression, which has been 

 deepened by subsequent perusal, that 

 his experiments were not only inade- 

 quate to solve the question, but unfair- 

 ly chosen. 



A dog or a cat, utterly hungry, is 

 placed in a box, from which it can es- 

 cape "by performing some simple (?) 

 action, such as pulling a wire loop, step- 

 ping on a platform or lever, clawing 

 down a string, or turning a wooden but- 

 ton." 



In the first place, what tends to de- 

 stroy the reasoning power more than 

 utter hunger? This intense physical 

 craving begets frenzy rather than rea- 

 son. The more intense this primeval 

 desire, the greater the demand upon 

 primitive instinct for its satisfaction. 

 In the open the cat will jump at a bird, 

 the dog at a bone. If the bird be up a 

 tree, the cat will climb; if the bone be 

 buried, the dog will burrow. Climbing 

 and burrowing are deep-rooted develop- 

 ments of the feline and the canine na- 

 ture. 



Put a dog or a cat, utterly hungry, 

 in a box and hang a piece of meat out- 

 side. Instinct prompts a jump through 

 the bai's of the box at the meat, and the 

 greater the number of unsuccessful at- 

 tempts the less the likelihood of the 

 animal with a gnawing stomach sitting 

 down to scrutinize the mechanical con- 

 struction of the box to the point of per- 

 ceiving that by stepping on a lever if 

 will open a door. How many millions 

 of years did it take two-legged man to 

 arrive at the perception of the use of 



the lever? Did the shaggy biped ar- 

 rive at that perception by sitting down 

 when utterly hungry and looking at a 

 lever; or did he, through countless gen- 

 erations, by some such chance as lift- 

 ing a stone with a stick, come to the 

 knowledge of weight and fulcrum? 



Put an anthropoid ape, some several 

 degrees nearer man in intelligence than 

 a cat, in a modern office elevator that 

 moves by the push of an electric button, 

 suspend the elevator between two sto- 

 ries, and what do you suppose that an- 

 thropoid ape will do? 



Put a schoolgirl fresh from belles- 

 lettres and matinees in the cab of a lo- 

 comotive and tell her to run it to the 

 next station. She can not but know 

 that steam will make the wheels go 

 round, but what will she do in the maze 

 of throttles, handles, disks, and rods 

 that confronts her? What will she do 

 if utterly hungry? 



Take a laborer from his pick and 

 shovel on the railway embankment and 

 put him at the desk of the general man- 

 ager. He can read and write. Let the 

 messenger boys and clerks shower him 

 with the letters and telegrams that bom- 

 bard that desk every day, and let him 

 try to settle the questions to which 

 they give rise. 



Now, why can not the schoolgirl run 

 the locomotive, the laborer the rail- 

 road? Because the relations of things 

 necessary to the tasks have never been 

 imprinted upon their registering cells; 

 because, in the latter case at least, of 

 the lack of power of co-ordination — that 

 is, the lack of the power of abstract 

 reasoning that the task involves. 



Why can not anybody do anything 

 as well as anybody else? Because cer- 

 tain relations have been more deeply 

 impressed upon certain brains than 

 upon others; because of the greater 

 power of certain brains to co-ordinate 

 certain relations, their greater ability 

 to give concrete manifestation of the 

 result of such co-ordination through the 

 efferent nerves. Otherwise any one of 

 us could design a bridge, compose a 

 symphony, or organize a trust. 



The oftener relations are impressed 

 upon the registering cells, the more 

 readily are those relations co-ordi- 

 nated, provided the brain structure be 

 of the requisite caliber. Reiterated im- 

 pression through the ages of the rela- 

 tions between their needs and sur- 



