232 SCIENCE PROGRESS 



disease is a disease ; second, that there is some difference 

 between a symptom and a disease ; and third, that diseases 

 may change into symptoms. Since, however, the things 

 themselves do not change, but a cough remains a cough ; dropsy, 

 dropsy ; and syncope, syncope ; the same in all material re- 

 spects now that they are symptoms as they were when they 

 were diseases, it is certain that whatever change has taken 

 place, since it is not in the things themselves, must be in our 

 way of contemplating them. There is no other possible way 

 of accounting for the change of diseases into symptoms. 

 Regarded in one way, contemplated from one point of view, 

 an instance of disease is a disease. Regarded in another 

 way, contemplated from another point of view, the same 

 instance of disease becomes a symptom. To medical men, 

 the difference that the mode of contemplating a thing makes 

 in our estimate of that thing is not very familiar, and may 

 appear startling ; but it is quite well known to psychologists, 

 and instances are familiar enough. That which was once a 

 species of birds, or insects, or plants, or what not, is now a 

 mere variety : that which was once a variety is now become 

 a species. The birds, or insects, or plants, are not changed : 

 even our knowledge of them is not changed : what alone is 

 changed is our way of contemplating or estimating them. 

 The revered philosopher of our youth is now a self-opinionated 

 dogmatist. He is not changed, but our mode of contem- 

 plating him is changed. We may look upon the sea as a 

 barrier between nations, or we may look upon it as a means 

 of intercourse between nations. The sea has not changed, 

 but our mode of contemplating it has changed. So when a 

 disease becomes a symptom, it is not the thing that is changed: 

 the change is solely and entirely in our estimate of it ; and 

 therefore the question, What is the difference between a symp- 

 tom and a disease ? is resolved into the question, What is 

 the difference in our mode or standard of estimating an in- 

 stance of disease that determines us to call that instance a 

 symptom instead of calling it a disease ? 



What our method or point of view is in contemplating it 

 as a symptom we have already discovered. In so contem- 

 plating it, we contemplate it as a sign or manifestation of 

 disorder of function. What is the point of view from which 

 we regard the very same occurrences when we call them 



