5 i8 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



thought account for much of both ancient and modern mythology, 

 without the intervention of spiritism ; they appear as a revival in civil- 

 ized nations in the astrology and alchemy of the middle ages, and may 

 to-day be traced among many savage tribes. The Zunis, for instance, 

 observe that the rattlesnake makes a rattling noise, moves with rapid 

 zigzag motion across the grass, strikes and kills suddenly. They 

 notice that the lightning is succeeded by rattling thunder, that it moves 

 with rapid zigzag motion across the sky, strikes and kills suddenly ; 

 they therefore call the lightning the brother of the rattlesnake, and 

 they refrain from killing a rattlesnake for fear the lightning may 

 strike them ! It is plain that such a notion could have arisen without 

 any conception of a spirit of the lightning distinct from the lightning, 

 of a ghost or snakeship distinct from the snake. Similarly, the Zunis 

 speak of the rainbow as akin to the measuring-worm, because it ap- 

 pears after rain, and has a striped, arched back, and so forth. It is 

 plain that such a notion could have also arisen without any conception 

 of a rainbow-spirit or of a worm-spirit. If fetichism could have arisen 

 without any connection with spiritism, it must scientifically be held 

 to have so arisen, unless spiritism could have resulted from as early or 

 from an earlier stage of thought. 



While fetichism, however, could and naturally would result from 

 purely analogical reasoning from one object to another, anthropo- 

 morphism or animism could possibly result only from reasoning of a 

 much less simple character. It is essentially subjective, and involves 

 considerable power of abstract thinking. It is subjective ; since, be- 

 fore a savage could imagine unseen personalities as the cause of visi- 

 ble movement, he must have a notion of his own personality, distinct 

 from his body, as the cause of his own movements. The notion of 

 personality is an abstract idea that is peculiarly complex, and that is 

 but slowly developed in conscious beings. Even a modern baby is 

 supposed to attain the notion of " self" and the meaning of "I" and 

 " me " but slowly, as is aptly described by the poet in " In Memoriam." 

 It is clear that a general notion or abstract idea may be formed from ob- 

 jective perceptions much more easily than the simplest abstract idea that 

 can result only from self-conscious reflection, and no number of purely 

 objective perceptions could ever suggest the notion of " will," " cause," 

 or " spirit," for there are no simple states of consciousness excited by 

 sensation corresponding to such notions. It is unscientific, therefore, to 

 assume that the earliest biped that could be called human rather than 

 anthropoid possessed an innate intuition of personality, and if he had 

 no such intuition, his crude notions about the nature of the universe 

 could not have been anthropomorphic or animistic. 



The simplest power of abstract thinking is, even by Mr. Romanes, 

 denied to animals. It is generally admitted to be impossible without 

 language, and language not in its simplest, most elementary form. It 

 is unscientific, therefore, to ascribe such a power to primitive men in 



