MIS GOVERNMENT OF GREAT CITIES. 525 



All kinds of improvements, the maintenance of good order, the secu- 

 rity and protection of life and property, affect them more vitally than 

 they affect other citizens. Would not a fire department which would 

 be satisfactory to the owners of warehouses, banks, hotels, offices, com- 

 mercial establishments, and costly private residences, be entirely ade- 

 quate to the needs of those who own no buildings ? Would not a 

 police establishment which would serve to protect the public and 

 private pi-operty of any large city and all its tax-paying inhabitants, 

 necessarily be sufficient to meet all the necessities of the rest of the 

 community ? 



In the matters of improving streets, and the laying out and orna- 

 menting of drives and parks, would not the improvements made by 

 the owners of property as a means of enhancing its value, as well as 

 for the purposes of personal enjoyment, be a satisfactory provision for 

 the use and comfort of those citizens who were not asked to contribute 

 toward the expense of making them ? 



In many cities the cost of all such improvements as sewers, pave- 

 ments, sidewalks, street-lamps, boulevards, and water-mains is charged 

 directly on the abutting property, and are only constructed when 

 petitioned for by a majority of the property-owners who will be called 

 upon to pay for them. In all such cases the very existence of these 

 improvements is a sufficient answer to the objection that public im- 

 provements would be impeded by an administration elected by tax- 

 payers. 



Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that the very opposite would be 

 true, and that, with the assurance that public works would be managed 

 with honesty and economy, the sentiment in favor of their construc- 

 tion would constantly increase. 



There are two interests which I think it is probable that non-tax- 

 paying citizens would be unwilling should be left entirely in the hands 

 of their tax-paying neighbors. I refer to the provisions to be made 

 for general education, and the proper and sufficient care of the poor. 



I do not personally feel that even these interests would thus be in 

 any degree jeopardized. They might, however, be so guarded and 

 protected in the organic act of incorporation as to be placed absolutely 

 beyond any danger. 



What would be the result if, in our great railway corporations and 

 large manufacturing companies, the board of directors, instead of 

 being chosen by the stockholders, were to be elected by the employes ? 

 What would be the relative probability of securing a competent and 

 efficient management ? There could be but one outcome to such a 

 policy : stockholders and employes would soon be involved in one 

 common ruin. Query, Can the municipal corporation, acting under a 

 similar policy, escape a like disaster ? 



But here, again, 1 expect to meet the objection once before noticed, 

 viz., that the plan, whatever be its merits, is an impracticable one. 



