SCIENTIFIC AND PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC REALISM. 793 



the almost total neglect of natural knowledge, might well have stifled 

 it. And, finally, it should be remembered that scholasticism really did 

 thrash out pretty effectually certain problems which have presented 

 themselves to mankind ever since they began to think, and which, I 

 suppose, will present themselves so long as they continue to think. 

 Consider, for example, the controversy of the Realists and the Nomi- 

 nalists, which was carried on with varying fortunes, and under various 

 names, from the time of Scotus Erigena to the end of the scholastic 

 period. Has it now a merely antiquarian interest ? Has Nominalism, 

 in any of its modifications, so completely won the day that Realism 

 may be regarded as dead and buried without hope of resurrection ? 

 Many people seem to think so, but it appears to me that, without tak- 

 ing Catholic philosophy into consideration, one has not to look about 

 far to find evidence that Realism is still to the fore, and indeed ex- 

 tremely lively.* 



The other day I happened to meet with a report of a sermon re- 

 cently preached in St. Paul's Cathedral. From internal evidence I am 

 inclined to think that the report is substantially correct. But, as I have 

 not the slightest intention of finding fault with the eminent theologian 

 and eloquent preacher to whom the discourse is attributed, for employ- 

 ment of scientific language in a manner for which he could find only 

 too many scientific precedents, the accuracy of the report in detail is 

 not to the purpose. I may safely take it as the embodiment of views 

 which are thought to be quite in accordance with science by many ex- 

 cellent, instructed, and intelligent people : 



The preacher further contended that it was yet more difficult to realize that 

 our earthly home would become the scene of a vast physical catastrophe. Imagi- 

 nation recoils from the idea that the course of Nature — the phrase helps to dis- 

 guise the truth — so unvarying and regular, the ordered sequence of movement 

 and life, should suddenly cease. Imagination looks more reasonable when it 

 assumes the air of scientific reason. Physical law, it says, will prevent the oc- 

 currence of catastrophes only anticipated by an apostle in an unscientific age. 

 Might not there, however, be a suspension of a lower law by the intervention 

 of a higher ? Thus, every time we lifted our arms we defied the laws of gravi- 

 tation, and in railways and steamboats powerful laws were held in check by 

 others. The Flood and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah were brought 

 about by the operations of existing laws, and may it not be that in His illimitable 

 universe there are more important laws than those which surround our puny life 

 — moral and not merely physical forces ? Is it inconceivable that the day will 



* It may be desirable to observe that, in modern times, the term " Realism " has 

 acquired a signification wholly different from that which attached to it in the middle 

 ages. We commonly use it as the contrary of Idealism. The Idealist holds that the 

 phenomenal world has only a subjective existence, the Realist that it has an objective 

 existence. I am not aware that any mediaeval philosopher was an Idealist in the sense in 

 which we apply the term to Berkeley. In fact, the cardinal defect of their speculations 

 lies in their oversight of the considerations which lead to Idealism. If many of them 

 regarded the material world as a negation, it was an active negation ; not zero, but a 

 minus quantity. 



