SCIENTIFIC AND PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC REALISM. 801 



nomena of growth and metamorphosis, which proceed in unbroken 

 succession and make up the life of the animal or plant. 



Thus, at starting, the egg or seed is matter having a " form " like 

 all other material bodies. l>ut this form has the peculiarity, in con- 

 tradistinction to lower substantial " forms," that it is a power which 

 constantly works toward an end by means of living organization. 



So far as I know, Liebnitz is the only philosopher (at the same 

 time a man of science, in the modern sense, of the first rank) who has 

 noted that the modern conception of Force, as a sort of atmosphere 

 enveloping the particles of bodies, and having potential or actual ac- 

 tivity, is simply a new name for the Aristotelian Form.* In modern 

 biology, up till within quite recent times, the Aristotelian conception 

 held undisputed sway ; living matter was endowed with " vital force," 

 and that accounted for everything. Whosoever was not satisfied with 

 that explanation was treated to that very " plain argument " — " con- 

 found you eternally " — wherewith Lord Peter overcomes the doubts of 

 his brothers in the "Tale of a Tub." "Materialist" was the mildest 

 term applied to him — fortunate if he escaped pelting with "infidel" 

 and " atheist." There may be scientific Rip Van Winkles about, who 

 still hold by vital force ; but among those biologists who have not been 

 asleep for the last quarter of a century " vital force " no longer figures 

 in the vocabulary of science. It is a patent survival of realism ; the 

 generalization from experience that all living bodies exhibit certain 

 activities of a definite character is made the basis of the notion that 

 every living body contains an entity, " vital force," which is assumed 

 to be the cause of those activities. 



It is remarkable, in looking back, to notice to what an extent this 

 and other survivals of scholastic realism arrested or, at any rate, im- 

 peded the application of sound scientific principles to the investigation 

 of biological phenomena. When I was beginning to think about these 

 matters, the scientific world was occasionally agitated by discussions 

 respecting the nature of the "species "and "genera" of naturalists, 

 of a different order from the disputes of a later time. I think most 

 were agreed that a "species" was something which existed object- 

 ively, somehow or other, and had been created by a Divine fiat. As 

 to the objective reality of genera, there was a good deal of difference 

 of opinion. On the other hand, there were a few who could see no 

 objective reality in anything but individuals, and looked upon both 

 species and genera as hypostatized universals. As for myself, I seem 

 to have unconsciously emulated William of Occam, inasmuch as almost 

 the first public discourse I ever ventured upon dealt with "Animal 

 Individuality," and its tendency was to fight the Nominalist battle even 

 in that quarter. 



* "Les formes des anciens ou entulechies nc sont autre chose que les forces" (The 

 forms of the ancients, or entelcchciae, are nothing else than forces). — (Leibnitz, " Lettre 

 au Pere Bouvet," 1697.) 

 vol. xxx. — 51 



