SOME PRINCIPLES OF WARFARE. 605 



SOME SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES OF WARFARE. 



BY WILLIAM J. ROE. 



AS in boxing, fencing, saber and bayonet exercises, there are com- 

 paratively few postures, guards, thrusts and strokes, so in war- 

 fare, whether the numbers be large or small, the arms most modern or 

 ancient, there are just a few principles to whose steady adherence and 

 skilful manipulation all success is clue. In order that these may become 

 apparent without irksome study of military details, let us imagine a 

 command of say a thousand men, fairly well drilled, of good ordinary 

 intelligence and engaged in a cause worthy of being fought for. We 

 have been in camp for some time, but an order has now come to join the 

 main army. This is a long distance off, the railway communications 

 have been broken, and the intervening country, though possessed of 

 good roads, is more or less in the hands of the enemy. 



Our scouts have kept us informed as to the condition of the country 

 for several miles around; our first day's march is, therefore, not ham- 

 pered with any especial dread of surprise. We move quickly and at ease. 

 Safe as everything appears to be, the commander relaxes none of the 

 needful precautions; at least fifty men, under command of an experi- 

 enced officer, are sent quite far to the front, the distance varying with 

 the nature of the country — the farther, the more broken it may be. 

 The best roads are followed; the men are allowed to march at ease, 

 though always preserving their company organization, while the officers 

 are always more or less on the alert. There is a small rear guard, but 

 it is upon the advance that the main responsibility falls. Of the fifty 

 thrown forward, about half will remain together; the rest are scattered; 

 some far to the front along the highway; others on either side of the 

 route, riding up the hills on either hand, making sure that no deep 

 gorge, dense growth of forest or thicket, nor even a field of grain con- 

 ceals an enemy. It is upon the alertness of those vedettes on front and 

 flanks that the safety of the force in great measure depends. History 

 records many relaxations of this principle of precaution, and for lack 

 of it sudden ambushes and deplorable disasters. It was thus, in spite of 

 Washington's repeated warnings, that Braddock fell into a cunning am- 

 buscade, and thus (not to multiply examples) that Custer and his com- 

 mand were massacred to a man among the high Rockies. 



On the annexed map the men may be located at 'A' marching from 

 T)' in the direction of the village, 'F'. The advance is at 'B', the rear 

 guard at 'C. The commander rides with the main column, near the 



