SOME PRINCIPLES OF WARFARE. 615 



August sun. It seems as if all chivalry had departed; it has but changed 

 its ways. 



The object of 'flanking 5 a position is to so manage as to turn that at- 

 tenuated line into a mass of men upon which to let loose with dire 

 effect either the quick-firing guns or the sharp edges of our horsemen's 

 sabers. 



Notice those long, bent, black lines, bending like fish hooks. The ar- 

 row heads indicate the direction of a flanking attack; from '¥', through 

 the woods, up the ravine, to fall upon the exposed end of the enemy's 

 front at 'K\ Such would be our most feasible method of flanking; the 

 foe might, however, have anticipated us, either by providing a bloody 

 hospitality somewhere in that ravine, or by a flank movement of his 

 own, as the bent black line shows, around the woods, to fall upon our 

 right flank at r E°. Such an operation, if successful for them, would be 

 utterly disastrous to us. 



Surprised by a sudden and unexpected attack upon the weakest point 

 and unable to change front in time, men lose heart, forget discipline, 

 huddle in masses, confused and disorganized, or fly like sheep, in either 

 case food for firearms, gluttonous of such occasions. It requires some- 

 times but a very small force upon a flank to produce great results; the 

 appearance upon the field, even at a distance, of Joseph E. Johnston's 

 corps at the first Bull Eun was sufficient to demoralize the whole Union 

 army, and at the battle of Areola, Bonaparte completely flanked the 

 Austrians with a few flourishes of his trumpets. 



So we have for a third maxim of war the necessity of protected 

 flanks. If we know or think that a Johnston lurks on either hand, we 

 ought to be sure of our Pattersons; if we apprehend an unfriendly visit 

 from a Blucher, we should see to it that our Grouchy is trustworthy. 



Let us now broaden our view of operations, that we may see how 

 the principles established for a limited number of men on the march, in 

 the field, or behind fortifications, may apply upon a larger scale. To 

 this end a brief study of the map (9) will show four contiguous coun- 

 tries — 'A', very populous, powerful and wealthy, having a navy capable 

 of control of the high seas, and a large and efficient army; 'C repre- 

 sents a country even more populous, but not aggressive, 'D' an in- 

 significant power, while 'B' is a country considerable in extent, but 

 largely mountainous, and sparsely inhabited by a rude but warlike 

 people. 



A cause of war comes up between 'A' and 'B'. In ancient times 

 the ruder nation would have been the aggressor, tempted by the wealth 

 and invited by the enervated populace of the larger civilization. Now 

 the conditions are likely to be reversed. However, war begins; the 

 forces of 'A' move hastily towards the frontier, while his fleet blockades 

 'B's' solitary seaport at the point 'E'. The maxim of caution now 



