7>S' MAN THE ONLY RE AS ONER? 511 



resented. And this snggests first of all that naming, properly so 

 called, only begins when things come to be apprehended as such, 

 that is to say, as wholes or unities. And here the question occurs 

 whether an animal, say a dog, that is just coming on to under- 

 stand a name or two, as that of the baby of the house, can be said 

 to have an organized percept precisely analogous to our own per- 

 cepts ? Dr. Romanes does not raise the question, but, in view of 

 the light thrown by modern psychology on the complexity of the 

 process of perception, it might not have been redundant. But 

 waiving this point as possibly smacking of the frivolous, we have 

 to ask whether an animal at the stage of mental development at 

 which it appears to begin to understand names, and even to make 

 use of them, is capable of carrjdng out the processes that go along 

 with, and in fact constitute, naming in its true and complete sense. 

 These processes have already been referred to in connection with 

 the subject of general ideas. To name an object appears to mean 

 to apprehend that object as a complex of qualities, to make men- 

 tal separation of these, and so to relate it to other objects both by 

 way of similarity (classification) and dissimilarity (individuation). 

 To use a name intelligently at all would seem to imply that these 

 processes have been carried out in a rough fashion at least. This 

 being so, we must be prepared when we endow an animal with the 

 power of naming, whether under the form of understanding or 

 that of using names, to say that it is carrying out in a rudi- 

 mentary way at least these thought-processes. How, it may be 

 asked, does Dr. Romanes deal with this point ? 



The answer to this question will be found by turning to new 

 distinctions or "stepping-stones" in the movement of thought- 

 evolution. Our author attaches importance to the distinction be- 

 tween higher and lower forms of the concept. Not only is there 

 the generic image to carry us on smoothly from image to concept, 

 but within the limits of the concept itself there are higher and 

 lower forms. Since, according to our author, a concept is any 

 named idea, a proper understanding of these conceptual grades 

 can only be obtained by a glance at his scheme of names. 



There are, according to Dr. Romanes, four stadia in the evolu- 

 tion of the complete logical sign or general name. Of these the 

 first is (a) the indicative sign — that is, a significant tone or gesture 

 intentionally expressive of a mental state, as the characteristic 

 tones by which animals express their emotions. These are not 

 names at all. Next to these in the order of evolution come (&) 

 denotative signs. These, whether used by children or animals, 

 e. g., talking birds, simply mark "particular objects, qualities, 

 and actions." They are learned by association, and are not con- 

 sciously employed as names. By the use of such a sign the talk- 

 ing bird merely fixes a vocal mark to a particular object, quality, 



