514 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



of the sign only gives an appearance of bridging over the interval 

 between signless ideation and sign-aided thought, just because it 

 aims at once at being something less than a true sign, and this 

 true sign itself. 



If our criticisms are just. Dr. Romanes can not be said to have 

 succeeded in his main object, viz., the obliteration of all quali- 

 tative difference between human and animal intellection by the 

 interposition of psychological links which can be seen to have the 

 essential characters of both. And here one is naturally led to ask 

 whether the author is after all on the right track. For he is a 

 master of his facts and shows considerable power in the marshal- 

 ing of his arguments, and, as even a hasty perusal of the volume 

 can show anybody, he has here concentrated his force in a severe 

 and sustained effort. Where he has failed it is conjecturable that 

 others may fail also. And so it behooves us to see whether he has 

 approached the problem in the right way, or, at least, in the only 

 possible way. 



The introduction of all this technical mechanism of receptual 

 ideation, lower concepts, and the rest, has for its avowed object 

 the avoidance of all introduction of qualitative change in the 

 process of intellectual evolution. Dr. Romanes tells us plainly at 

 the outset that he is going to establish identity of kind between 

 the animal and the human type of intellection. And, no doubt, if 

 it were possible to do this in the way here attempted — that is to 

 say, by interposing transitional forms which virtually efface all 

 qualitative unlikeness — it would be a great advantage to the evo- 

 lutionist. But it may be said that it is not the only way of satis- 

 fying the requirements of the evolution hypothesis. Dr. Romanes 

 pertinently remarks, in meeting a priori objections to the deriva- 

 tion of human from animal intellection, that in the life of the 

 human individual we actually have a series of transitions from 

 animal to human psychosis. ISTow, a glance at the intellectual de- 

 velopment of the individual shows us that distinct qualitative 

 differences are introduced. Not to speak of the obvious fact that 

 every new sensation effects a qualitative addition to the infant's 

 mental life, there is the more important fact that the first image 

 of the absent mother or nurse introduces a new sphere of mental 

 activity. The child that dreams and imagines is already a differ- 

 ent being from the infant that merely touches and sees. Similarly 

 it may be said that the first conscious process of breaking up its 

 sense-presentations, the first distinct apprehension of relations, is 

 epoch-making just because it marks the oncoming of a new mode 

 of mental activity, a qualitative extension of its conscious life. 



To say this, however, is not to say that the process of develop- 

 ment is wanting in continuity. For, first of all, these higher 

 forms of activity introduce themselves in the most gradual way, 



