''NATURALISM AND AGNOSTICISMS 349 



the appearance of the moon, and there are various reasons for 

 thinking that the planet can not be a suitable abode for living 

 beings, at least for beings resembling the inhabitants of the earth. 

 Uranus and Neptune are too far away to present any attraction for 

 amateur observation. 



PKOFESSOR WARD O^ "I^ATURALISM AND 

 AGNOSTICISM." 



By HERBEKT SPENCER. 



IN a recent advertisement. Professor Ward's work entitled as 

 above was characterized as " one of the most important contri- 

 butions to philosophy made in our time in England," and this was 

 joined with the prophecy that it " may even do something to re- 

 store to philosophy the prominent place it once occupied in English 

 thought." Along with laudatory expressions, I have observed in 

 some notices reprobation of the 'manner adopted by Professor 

 Ward in his attack upon my views — I might almost say upon me; 

 and one of the reviewers gives examples of the words he uses — 

 " ridiculous," " absurd," " blunder," " nonsense," " amazing fal- 

 lacy," '' our oracle." 



When, some time ago, I glanced at one of the volumes, I came 

 upon a passage which at once stamped the book by displaying the 

 attitude of the writer; but, being then otherwise occupied, I de- 

 cided not to disturb myself by reading more. Now, however, 

 partly by the reviews I have seen, and partly by the comments of 

 a friend, I have been shown that I can not let the book pass with- 

 out remark. The assumption that a critic states rightly the doc- 

 trine he criticises is so generally made, that in the absence of proof 

 to the contrary his criticisms are almost certain to be regarded as 

 valid. And when the critic is a Cambridge Professor and an Hono- 

 rary LL. D., the assumption will be thought fully warranted. 



Let me set out by quoting some passages disclosing the kind of 

 feeling by which Professor Ward's criticisms are influenced, if not 

 prompted. In his preface he says: — 



" When at length Naturalism, is forced to take account of the facts of 

 life and mind, we find the strain on the mechanical theory is more than 

 it will bear. Mr. Spencer has blandly to confess that ' two volumes ' of 

 his Synthetic Philosophy are missing, the volumes that should connect 

 inorganic with biological, evolution." 



Respecting the first of these sentences, I have only to remark 

 that I have said (as in First Principles, § 62) and repeatedly im- 



