no THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



peat that, although we may have a sub-consciousness of objects and 

 acts, that sub-conscious state is true automatism, and that such auto- 

 matic acts are in no sense voluntary until the attention has been con- 

 centrated upon them. For example, again I press this tambour, be- 

 cause I desire to raise the flag, and I keep that raised while I attend 

 to what I am saying to you. My action of keeping the flag raised is 

 only present to my consciousness in a slight or subordinate degree, 

 and does not require my attention, deliberate thought, or choice, and 

 therefore, I repeat, is not a voluntary action ; in fact, it could be carried 

 on perfectly well by this lower sensori-motor center, which only now 

 and then sends up a message to say it is doing its duty, in the same 

 way as a sentry calls out " All is well " at intervals. 



But to return. In consequence of the obvious fact that we have 

 two nerve-organs, each more or less complete, some writers have im- 

 agined that we have two minds ; and to the Rev. Mr. Barlow, a 

 former secretary of this Institution, is due the credit of recognizing 

 the circumstances which seem to favor that view. It was keenly 

 taken up, and the furore culminated in a German writer (whose 

 name, I am ashamed to say, has escaped me) postulating that we pos- 

 sess two souls. 



Now, the evidence upon which this notion rests, that the two halves 

 of the brain might occasionally work independently of one another at 

 the same moment, was of two kinds. In the first place it was asserted 

 that we could do two different things at once, and in the second place 

 evidence was produced of people acting and thinking as if they had 

 two minds. 



Kow, while of course admitting that habitually one motor center 

 usually acts at one moment by itself, I am prepared to deny in toto 

 that two voluntary acts can be performed at the same time, and I have 

 already shown what is necessary for the fulfillment of all the condi- 

 tions of volition, and that these conditions are summed up in the word 

 attention. 



Further, I have already shown that, when an idea comes into the 

 mind owing to some object catching the eye, both sensory areas are 

 engaged in considering it. It seems to me I might stop here, and 

 say that here was an a jyriori reason why two simultaneous voluntary 

 acts are impossible ; but as my statements have met with some oppo- 

 sition, I prefer to demonstrate the fact by some experiments. 



The problem, stated in physiological terms, is as follows : Can this 

 right motor region act in the process of volition, while at the same 

 time this other motor area is also engaged in a different act of voli- 

 tion ? Some say this is possible ; but in all cases quoted I have found 

 that sub-conscious or automatic actions are confused with truly volun- 

 tary acts. I mean that such automatic acts as playing bass and treble 

 are not instances of pure volition, as the attention is not engaged on 

 both notes at once. 



