THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE. 215 



combine and separate," and bence we must consider the material of 

 our thoughts, "the elements Avhich we bring together or co-agitate." 

 These are sensations, percepts, concepts, and names. These, though 

 distinguishable, never exist in reality as separate entities. " No words 

 are possible without concepts, no concepts without percepts, no per- 

 cepts without sensations." The author then attempts to show, in re- 

 verse order, that " sensations are impossible without pei'cepts, and 

 percepts without concepts, just as the cloth is impossible without the 

 threads, and the threads without the wool." This made out to his 

 satisfaction, the argument follows that concepts are impossible with- 

 out words — hence percepts and sensations are impossible ; and thus 

 thinking is not possible without language. 



It would be much easier to deal with Professor Miiller's reasoning 

 if it were not complicated by various qualifications of the above simple 

 statements, which make his meaning somewhat doubtful. lie declares 

 in one place that " thoughts may exist without words, because other 

 signs may take the place of words. Five fingers or five lines are quite 

 sufiicient to convey the concept of five between people speaking differ- 

 ent languages, possibly between deaf-and-dumb people who speak no 

 language at all." Thus, it seems, we are to consider language as 

 consisting of other signs as well as words. This, however, is not to 

 affect the general proposition. Again, the author does in his book 

 concede that we can reason without words, but in his letter to Galton 

 of May 15, 1887, he declares that this "is no more than reasoning 

 without pronouncing words." It is "symbolic, abbreviated, or hushed 

 language," which " jDresupposes the former existence of words." More- 

 over, in this same letter, he avers that " sensation, passions, and intui- 

 tive judgments . . . clearly require no words for their realization." 

 lie also implies that seeing, feeling, acting — all may take place with- 

 out what he terms thinking. " Instantaneous and thoughtless action 

 is often more successful than the slow results of reasoning." But 

 without seeking for further illustration, enough has been noted to 

 show that Professor Miiller has not clearly and consistently developed 

 his own doctrine. 



If thinking is bringing together or combining, addition with its 

 complementary subtraction, the question arises, whether we are to 

 apply the term to the combining into unity which is necessary in every 

 act of knowing, in order to make that presentation of an object to the 

 subject which is cognition itself, or to that combination which we 

 ordinarily designate by the term association. My eye rests upon a 

 patch of color on the wall ; the cognition of this as an object involves 

 " co-agitation " or combining. Surely we are not asked to believe that 

 the presentation of this to the mind as an integer, and the holding of 

 the mind's attention upon it, is impossible without language ! It can 

 not be that this is thinking in Professor Miiller's intended sense of 

 the word. Rather, he means association. " The very moment we be- 



