REMARKS UPON TASTE. 



263 



sive demesne ; but this form, being generally 

 employed in churches, is in some degree con- 

 sidered sacred, and consequently its employ- 

 ment in villas would be too great a shock to 

 our received prejudices. A Christian church 

 built in the Chinese style, every one must 

 feel, would prove oflFensive. 



In this manner we might pursue the sub- 

 ject of what writers on taste call accidental 

 associations, to show how extremely difficult, 

 or rather how impossible, it is, for any indi- 

 vidual to have a perfect taste ; and, at the 

 same time, to show how numerous the chan- 

 ces are against any two persons thinking, in 

 matters of taste, exactly alike. Independ- 

 ently of the difference in the organisation of 

 individuals, there are, as we have seen, so 

 many other causes operating upon them in 

 different degrees, that it is hardly possible to 

 conceive two individuals, even if they are of 

 similar organisation and education, similarly 

 operated upon by external circumstances. 

 Hence, whenever we find two persons agree- 

 ing in taste, we may generally conclude, either 

 that the taste of the one has been formed on that 

 of the other ; or, that the one gives way to the 

 other, whenever their sentiments ai-e different. 



Every one's taste, therefore, is the natural 

 and unavoidable result of all the different 

 circumstances in which he has been placed ; 

 and hence he can no more alter it, on being 

 desired to do so, than he can change any 

 other opinion he has formed on any subject, 

 without tracing back the steps which led to 

 his forming it. Hence, the necessity of chari- 

 ty, or mutual forbearance, in all matters of 

 taste ; and the propriety, when we state our 

 approval or disapprobation of any object of 

 taste, of giving the reasons on which our 

 opinion is founded. 



In arriving at this conclusion, one object 

 which we have in view is, to suggest what we 

 think ought to be the proper language of cri- 

 ticism in matters of architectural taste. In 



the first place, the terms good and bad taste, 

 in an absolute sense, should seldom, if ever, 

 be employed ; since they must always be 

 either good or bad, relatively to circumstan- 

 ces more or less limited. We would therefore 

 qualify the term good, when so used, by ad- 

 ding another term expressive of the circum- 

 stances relatively to which it was considered 

 good : such as, a good taste in Gothic archi- 

 tecture or in the Elizabethan style ; or a good 

 or bad taste in street buildings or in villas. 

 We would prefer, however, substituting, for 

 the term good, some term expressive of the 

 kind of goodness : such as, a just taste in ar- 

 chitecture generally ; a correct taste in the 

 Grecian style ; a refined taste in the Tudor 

 Gothic ; a cultivated taste in Italian architec- 

 ture, &c. In like manner, instead of the terra 

 bad taste, we would employ such expressions 

 as servile taste, incorrect taste, crude taste, 

 &c.; and, when speaking of a taste without refer- 

 ence to its being either good or bad, we would 

 use such epithets as, taste of a particular age, 

 master, or style, &c. In this way, when speak- 

 ing cither of the taste or judgment of an archi- 

 tect, or of the expression or construction of a 

 building, we may always employ terms which 

 shall be characteristic of the excellences or de- 

 fects of the artist or object criticised ; and not 

 merely, like the terms good and bad, — words 

 conveying no other idea to our readers or 

 hearers, than that of our approbation or dislike. 

 Since the taste of no individual can be per- 

 fect, and since no two individuals are likely 

 to agree in every respect in any matters of 

 taste, what, it may be asked, are the com- 

 parative values of a just, a correct, a delicate, 

 an intense, and a refined taste, supposing each 

 to be equally free from accidental influences ? 

 Our answer is, that a just or reasoning taste 

 is decidedly the best ; since a greater number 

 of persons are likely to understand arguments 

 founded on reason and utility, than to agree 

 in sentiment, or to possess the same degree 

 of imagination. 



