LEGAL ANALYSIS 53 



legislation, (2) founded upon some basis in fact, (3) plus a rational 

 choice of means to accomplish the objective. The first section of 

 the analysis is devoted to the development of this aspect of the de- 

 cisional law of the Supreme Court, particularly to show what is 

 meant by the references to "rational determination," "some basis in 

 fact," and "rational choice of means." 



The second part of the analysis concerns the development of 

 these same constitutional concepts in the decisional law of the Wash- 

 ington State Supreme Court. This Court of course applies not only 

 the provisions of the federal constitution, but also the corresponding 

 provisions of the state constitution. Here, too, the general conclusion 

 is the same, although the Washington decisions seem not so clearly 

 to lead to that conclusion. This may be traceable to the fact that the 

 Washington decisions have not had the benefit, such as it was, of such 

 a clear-cut break with the past as occurred in the United States 

 Supreme Court in the mid-thirties, particularly with reference to that 

 Court's renewed respect for legislative regulation of economic affairs. 

 This section treats the Washington cases in detail, developing particu- 

 larly the aspects pertinent to the validity of the proposal under study 

 and developing further some of the aspects of the constitutional 

 doctrines discussed in the first section. 



The third section applies the learning of the first two sections 

 to the facts of the salmon fishery, showing how the legislative 

 judgment could and should be sustained. Without any pretense at 

 completeness or precision, it shows that the peculiarities and intrica- 

 cies of the salmon fishery, in both its biological and its economic 

 characteristics, plus the strong interest of the state in the salmon as 

 a source of food and as a major factor in the economic well-being 

 of the state, could, with the utmost of good sense, persuade the legis- 

 lature that a restriction on the number of commercial salmon fisher- 

 men was necessary. 



Certain legal concepts, which are, in a sense, purely collateral 

 to the basic reasoning and analysis, are discussed in the next section, 

 not only to point out their usefulness, but also to illustrate their 

 undesirability if used without restraint. Under this heading are 

 discussed the concepts of police power, of the "right-privilege" 

 classification of occupations, and of "property" in fish. 



In addition, certain cases had to be distinguished, as they are 

 in the succeeding section, for, if not seen clearly, they could be major 

 obstacles. The legislation in the first group contained either a gross 



