76 SALMON GEAR LIMITATION 



. . ."^^ Later on, the court said, "The regulation of our salmon in- 

 dustry for conservation purposes certainly bears directly on our 

 state's general welfare/'^"^ Still later it said, "It [the fishing industry] 

 is an affair of great public interest and concern. "^^ 



The important thing to notice about the two foregoing cases is 

 that the regulation was in the interest of promoting the economic 

 welfare of the state. It had nothing to do with the health of the 

 Washington residents, so far as the quality of food they ate was 

 concerned. In the apple case, for instance, the red apple growers 

 who complained were most insistent that their not-quite-so-red apples 

 were every bit as healthful as the really-red ones; the important point, 

 however, was that it was the redness quality which appealed to the 

 consumer. Since he was most likely to be an out-of-state person, 

 the only benefit to be derived by the State of Washington was in the 

 increased well-being of the apple industry from the increased sales 

 to be expected from the redness of the apples. Washington apples, 

 in other words, compete well on foreign markets because the red 

 varieties are held to a very high standard of redness. 



One further aspect of the "valid legislative purpose" requirement 

 should be observed: Occasionally, the argument comes up in a 

 challenge to some incidental aspect of the legislation, not with respect 

 to its main purpose. When this happens it is important to notice that 

 in addition to a main legislative purpose, there are frequently one or 

 more subsidiary purposes, all equally valid; usually these are pre- 

 sented for legislative judgment because they are involved in the 

 means by which the legislature chooses to effect its primary purpose. 

 To put this point in concrete illustrative terms: In Campbell v. 

 State, ^^ a 1942 case, the court dealt with a legislative requirement 

 that a dentist could not conduct a dental office in his own name 

 without being personally present in that office during a majority of 

 the time that such oflFice was open, thus effectively preventing "chain- 

 dentistry." The court first held that this statute had a legitimate pur- 

 pose: "Certainly it is within the province of the legislature to protect 

 the public against all forms of fraud and deception tending to con- 

 ceal the professional identity of the dentist who is, in fact, rendering 



63. Id. at 286; 280 P. 2d at 1041. 



64. Id. at 288; 280 P. 2d at 1042-1043. 



65. Id. at 290; 280 P. 2d at 1044. 



66. 12 Wn. 2d 459, 122 P. 2d 458 (1942), 



