LEGAL ANALYSIS 79 



for legislative classifications of persons is important to the problem 

 at hand, especially when the details of any particular scheme for 

 restrictive licensing are scrutinized. This will be particularly true 

 when one considers the characteristics of the grandfather clause, 

 the transferability of licenses, or other similar details. 



It must also be pointed out that certain imperfections in legis- 

 lative classifications must be tolerated; in other words, the court 

 does not expect the impossible from the legislature. Legislation of 

 necessity has to be somewhat general, it must look ahead, it must 

 try to envision all the circumstances which will come within the 

 sweep of language employed, but it cannot meet the difficulties of 

 every person who might be affected. All citizens must accept the 

 discomforts of this inherent difficulty with legislation. Certain of 

 these "imperfections" are so recurrently raised in litigation and held 

 to be insufficient bases for invalidity that a separate enumeration of 

 them is desirable: 



First, it is not a basis for holding a statute to violate the equal 

 protection concept that the particular litigant who complains of the 

 classification is, himself, one who does not contribute to the evil 

 sought to be corrected or avoided. To put the clear case first, suppose 

 a 15-year-old boy sues the Director of Licenses to force the issuance 

 of a driver's license to him, offering to prove that he is as competent 

 a driver as all or most 1 6-year-old drivers. He reasons that since the 

 legislative classification of persons into the group 16 and over and 

 those under 16 is an attempt to license only competent drivers, and 

 since he is competent, the regulation is unreasonable as to him. The 

 court would certainly not be persuaded. The proper basis for the 

 court's reaction would be that a legislature cannot be expected to 

 effect hs general purpose (here, safe driving) by exact measurements 

 of the talents of each driver in the state. It is sufficient to make a 

 good approximation of how old persons generally must be before 

 they, taken as a whole, have the ability and judgment to be safe 

 drivers. 



The point, not with reference to drivers, but with reference to 

 dentists, has been argued in litigation. The "chain-dentistry" case 

 referred to earlier contains such an aspect. In that case, Campbell 

 V. State J^ the court said: 



"It may well be that the operation of the office in Tacoma, which 

 appellant desires to open under his own name, would, in and of itself, 



75. 12 Wn. 2d 459, 122 P. 2d 458 (1942), discussed supra, nn. 66-69. 



