80 SALMON GEAR LIMITATION 



result in no harm to the pubhc. The legislature, however, was entitled 

 to consider and deal with the general problem of the commercial exploita- 

 tion of the dental profession. If, in the opinion of the legislature, chain 

 ofhce dentistry and dental offices conducted under corporate or fictitious 

 names, or under the name of a dentist who has nothing to do with the 

 practice of the profession in connection with the carrying on of the office, 

 tend to introduce into the profession unscrupulous practices which tend 

 to lower the ethics and standards of the dental profession, to the injury 

 of the health of the community and the public welfare, the legislature had 

 the poy/er to place the limitation in question upon the general practice of 

 the profession, even though in certain cases the act forbidden might not 

 result in any of the evils which it was believed might follow from the 

 frequent employment of the forbidden practice. "^^ 



A further factor which the courts consider wholly immaterial 

 in judging the constitutionality of legislation is the legislative motive, 

 as distinquished from its purpose. Assuming the court has found that 

 there is, indeed, a legitimate purpose to the statute, such as the 

 promotion of the public health, the court simply will not inquire 

 whether the motive of some of the legislators might, in any particular 

 case, have been to favor one person who might benefit from the 

 statute. A striking example of this occurred in Continental Baking 

 Co. V. Mount Vernon/^ a 1935 decision upholding a city ordinance 

 licensing bakeries and bakery-product deliveries. The point for argu- 

 ment was an exception in the statute for retail stores making retail 

 deliveries. After pointing to the legitimate purpose of the regulations 

 and the reasonableness of the means taken to effect those purposes, 

 the court dealt with the argument of favoritism as follows: 



"The appellants [a state-wide concern with home office in Seattle] 

 charge that the purpose of the ordinance is to hamper them in competing 

 with local manufacturers of bakery products. We are not permitted to 

 speculate on the motives prompting the city council in the enactment of 

 the ordinance, so long as we find it reasonable on its face and within 

 the city's power. "''^ 



Recurrent throughout Washington decisions dealing with equal 

 protection concepts is the thought that all persons "similarly situated" 

 must be equally treated, or that the law must bear upon such people 

 equally. This, it should be apparent, is but another way of saying 

 that if the legislature wants to differentiate between groups of per- 

 sons, there must be some basis for doing so in view of the objective 

 to be accomplished by the legislation. As applied to a situation in 



76. /t/. at 467, 468; 122 P. 2d at 462, 463. 



77. 182 Wash. 68, 44 P. 2d 821 ( 1935). 



78. Id. at 73; 44 P. 2d at 823. 



