LEGAL ANALYSIS 81 



which it has become apparent to the legislature that the public good 

 is served by restricting the number of participants in a given economic 

 activity, there should be some rational step taken to effect such a 

 reduction. Since this objective has no strictly personal characteristic 

 such as how good a fisherman a particular person may be, then any 

 scheme which is at least neutral toward applicants should be sufficient. 

 In this sense it could be said that of all persons who would like to 

 become fishermen, they all at least have an even and fair chance 

 of becoming such. This might be compared to the fair and even 

 chance which all persons have of becoming a doctor or a lawyer. 

 Some may make it; others may not; but at least the legislature will 

 have gone about it in a fair way. The law will "bear equally on all 

 persons similarly situated." 



It should be further emphasized that all legislation is bound to 

 have its incidental good and bad effect which simply cannot be 

 entirely eliminated, nor should the existence of this collateral effect 

 be used as a basis for invalidating legislation. For example, in pre- 

 scribing the location of a highway or a bridge, some persons as a 

 purely incidental matter are going to suffer from the depreciation of 

 their property; others are going to benefit from the increased utility 

 of their property by its proximity to the highway or bridge. So it 

 must be with other legislation. Here, a restrictive licensing system 

 will probably benefit those who can become fishermen; and it is 

 equally true that those who do not become fishermen will be hurt. 

 These are not the primary consequences of the legislation, for its 

 purpose was and is in entirely different terms. Rather, it is in terms 

 of the larger public good, measured by the legislature and found 

 by it to be served by the restrictive licensing scheme. 



In Campbell v. StateJ"^ the case involving chain dentistry, the 

 legislature permitted present operators to continue under a grand- 

 father clause. The court dealt with the argument that the grandfather 

 clause favored present operators in the following language: 



'it is true that such persons may exercise a privilege denied to others, 

 but this same result follows from many lawful statutory classifications. 

 Certainly such persons are granted no monopoly in the sense that compe- 

 tition with them is limited. By any lawful classification, rights more or 

 less exclusive are vested in particular classes of persons. If for this reason 

 legislative classification is unlawful, it would seem that such classifications 

 could seldom be sustained. "^^ 



79. 12 Wn. 2d 459. 122 P. 2d 458 ( 1942). discussed supra, nn. 66-69 and 75-76. 



80. Id. at 472, 473; 122 P. 2d at 464. 



