82 SALMON GEAR LIMITATION 



2. Due Process 



The decisions of the Washington State Supreme Court with re- 

 spect to due process of law as appHed to economic activity stem 

 in part from the constitution of the state and in part from the Due 

 Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal consti- 

 tution. There is such an intermixture between the two, plus a sub- 

 stantial body of law dealing with the same problems in terms of 

 the "police power," that it is probably best to separate the various 

 factors first, in order to promote a better understanding of the case 

 law later discussed. 



First, just as the Washington court has had occasion to apply 

 the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, so it 

 has also had occasion to apply the Due Process Clause of the federal 

 constitution to various cases which have come before it. In addition, 

 and unlike the United States Supreme Court, the Washington court 

 also has occasion to apply the corresponding clause of the state 

 constitution. This state clause is Art. I, §3, "No person shall be 

 deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 

 This is substantially identical to the Fourteenth Amendment pro- 

 vision, which reads, ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of 

 life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 



The Washington court has not made any differentiation between 

 the application of the two due process clauses, frequently stating 

 that they mean the same. For example. Judge Main in State v. 

 Pitney, ^^ a 1914 case, said, ". . .[T]he due process of law clauses in 

 the state and Federal constitutions are substantially the same."^^ 



A further terminology, however, so frequently appears, especially 

 in the state cases, that some discussion is warranted: Often when 

 the problem is whether some particular legislation infringes upon 

 the due process clauses, the court talks in terms of what legislation 

 is justified by the "police power." 



At least for purposes of logical analysis the term is an unfor- 

 tunate one, for it has led to considerable confusion. Properly speak- 

 ing, it means only that so far as our formal scheme of government 

 is concerned, the state is empowered to enact all laws except as 

 the state and federal constitutions may impose restrictions. This 

 power of the staie has often been referred to as the "reserved" 



81. 79 Wash. 608, 140Pac. 918 (1914). 



82. Id. at 616; 140 Pac. at 919. 



