LEGAL ANALYSIS 83 



power or as a reservoir of power. The difficulties have been intro- 

 duced, however, in attempting to define its outer hmits, thinking 

 apparently that it had some such limits apart from those constitu- 

 tionally imposed. In truth, there need be none, except perhaps as 

 there might be some political philosophy about the right of the people 

 to go outside of constitutional government. Presumably, however, 

 our governmental system is complete, and so long as the definition 

 of those outer limits of the "police power" coincided with the re- 

 strictions which the constitutions imposed upon the states, there 

 was no real difficulty introduced in considering the police power as 

 a separate entity. When, however, the police power was thought to 

 be either something less than what the constitutions allowed or as 

 something more, then logical difficulties were introduced which have 

 plagued the courts. Unfortunately for the problem herein discussed, 

 the difficulties may still persist in some degree. 



That the police power is affirmatively larger than permitted by 

 the constitutional limits was asserted, for example, in Frach v. Schoet- 

 tler,^^ a 1955 case in which the court stated: 



"Appellants' rights with reference to the 'due process clause' and the 

 'privilege and immunity clauses,' as set out in Art. I § 3 and 12, of the 

 state constitution, and in § 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United 

 States constitution, are not abridged by the act in question. It is the estab- 

 lished rule in Washington that none of these constitutional provisions 

 applies to law enacted by the state legislature in the exercise of its police 

 power [citing three earlier Washington cases]. "^"^ 



This statement was returned to the court in Peterson v. Hagan,^^ 

 a 1960 case, where 



". . . [T]he attorney general argues that the equal protection clause 

 and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United 

 States Constitution and Art. 1, § 12 of the state constitution do not apply 

 to legislation enacted under the police power. This court itself has used 

 such broad language . . . [But] we reject flatly the argument that the due 

 process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions 

 do not apply to statutes enacted in the exercise of the police power. 

 Otherwise, the result would be a police state, and legislative branch of the 

 government would be omnipotent. "^^ 



IVIore subtle and perhaps more inimical to the general welfare 

 has been the other consequence, of conceiving the police power as 



83. 46 Wn. 2d 281. 280 P. 2d 1038 ( 1955) 



84. Id. at 291; 280 P. 2d at 1044. 



85. 56 Wn. 2d 48, 351 P. 2d 127 (1960). 



86. /i/. at 52, 53:351 P. 2d at 130. 



