88 SALMON GEAR LIMITATION 



court also had held the state law valid. This position was reaffirmed 

 in Peterson v. Hagan.^^^ a 1960 case dealing with a state fair labor 

 standards act. While holding the act unconstitutional upon a narrow 

 and strict interpretation of the requirements of equal protection, the 

 court summarily disposed of the argument that due process forbids 

 legislation which would apply generally to restrict the hours and 

 wages of labor, §aying: 



"But since that decision [West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish] and United 

 States V. Darby'^^^ [a 1941 United States Supreme Court decision] sus- 

 taining the constitutionality of the Federal Wages and Hours Act, the 

 right of the legislature to regulate hours and wages is not open to serious 

 question . . . Seattle v. Smyth^^^ [a 1900 Washington decision], to the con- 

 trary notwithstanding ... It remains only to say that Seattle v. Smyth, 

 supra, is now overruled. "^^"^ 



Similarly, a legislative change in a former rule with reference to 

 negotiable instruments used in commercial relationships can be 

 effected without violating the due process concept even though the 

 change is not for the immediate health, safety, or morals of the public 

 and even though it may operate to relieve a bank of its own negli- 

 gence, putting the loss on a person who acted without negligence. 

 In this case. Overtake Homes, Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank,^^^ 

 decided in 1961, the legislature had provided that the bank which 

 honored a forged check could nevertheless charge the check to the 

 account of the depositor whose signature was forged unless the de- 

 positor notified the bank of the forgery within sixty days after the 

 cancelled check was returned to the depositor. The former rule under 

 the non-statutory law had allowed the depositor a reasonable time 

 after the discovery of the forgery, not necessarily this absolute sixty- 

 day period. The court upheld the statute, saying: 



"It is well settled that, inasmuch as banks are indispensable agencies 

 through which the industry, trade, and commerce of all civilized countries 

 and communities are carried on, the business which they transact, though 

 for private profit, is of a pre-eminently public nature, and is therefore 

 universally recognized as a proper subject of legislative regulation . . . That 

 act did not deprive the plaintiff of any right which it hitherto had [the law 

 had been changed before plaintiff deposited his funds], and it was well 

 within the power of the legislature to change the common law ... It must 



101. 56 Wn. 2d 48, 351 P. 2d 127 (1960), discussed supra, nn. 85-86. 



102. 312U.S. 100 (1941). 



103. 22 Wash. 327; 60 Pac. 1 120 (1900). 



104. 56 Wn. 2d at 54, 55; 351 P. 2d at 131. 



105. 57 Wn. 2d 881, 360 P. 2d 570 ( 1961 ). 



