98 SALMON GEAR LIMITATION 



or new licensee. Yet we permit this accumulation of value because 

 of the overriding public interest served in the control of number 

 of participants thus achieved. And, most important, the emphasis 

 should be that whether to have such a limitation is a legislative 

 judgment, not a court judgment. As Judge Hill for the majority in 

 the Ragan case stated: 



"We cannot say that the legislation enacted by the city, regulating the 

 operation of jukeboxes is unreasonable or oppressive, or that it does not 

 have a substantial relation to the accomplishment of purposes fairly within 

 the scope of the police power."^^^ 



A somewhat similar case occurred in California recently, men- 

 tioned here because it, like the Ragan case, went to the United States 

 Supreme Court, with results presently to be indicated. In the Cali- 

 fornia case, In re Petersen,^^^ decided in 1958, San Francisco's 

 method of licensing taxicabs was challenged as violating equal pro- 

 tection requirements. The system allowed taxicab operators to oper- 

 ate cab stands at only certain designated places around the city and 

 further provided that only the operator who had the permission of 

 the adjoining owner (usually a hotel operator or similar business- 

 man) would be entitled to occupy that particular place. The court 

 upheld this, with this language: 



"If many cabs of different owners should try to park at one stand, an 

 obstruction of traffic might result. The sole permittee who has a telephone 

 connection with its exclusive stand would be in a better position to main- 

 tain a constant cab service at the stand, without an excessive supply of 

 cabs at some times and a dearth at others. Exclusive stands may facilitate 

 police supervision and may prevent disorderly and aggressive solicitation 

 of one customer by drivers of different taxicab owners. Accordingly, we 

 cannot agree that there are no rational grounds for the establishment of 

 exclusive stands. "^^^ 



Further on, with reference to the required consent of the adjoin- 

 ing owner, the court said: 



"Under these circumstances it can reasonably be considered in the 

 interest of harmonious relations and good service to give effect to the 

 preferences of the occupants of the property in designating stands and 

 their permittees. If the consent system also has undesirable features, such 

 as the power of the occupant to exact payment for his consent, the weigh- 

 ing of the advantages and disadvantages is a matter of policy wholly 

 within the legislative power of the municipality. "^^^ 



125. 58 Wn. 2d at 786; 364 P. 2d at 920. 



126. 51 Cal. 2d 177; 331 P. 2d 24 (1958), 



127. Id. Hill. 



128. /J. at 28. 



