106 SALMON GEAR LIMITATION 



The later case is significantly different from the earlier one in 

 just one important respect: The court held that indeed the consti- 

 tutional rights of the litigant liquor dealer had been violated. In 

 Derby Club, Inc. v. Becket^"^^ a 1953 decision, the court held that 

 certain legislation pertaining to "bottle clubs" violated both the 

 state and federal due process clauses. The reasoning by which the 

 court came to this result is unimportant for present purposes; what 

 is important is that the court, dealing admittedly with an activity 

 previously labeled a matter of grace, actually found that the entity 

 dispensing that grace, i.e., the state, had to conform to constitutional 

 standards in doing so! Of the nine judges, one dissented, but he 

 did so on the merits of the constitutional question. He, incidentally, 

 was the author of the opinion in the previous Randies case from 

 which a quotation has been set out in the discussion of that case, 

 above. In the present case, he modified his stand a little: 



"Much greater latitude with reference to the issuance of a license can 



be extended to the liquor board than is the case where the subject matter 



is a business which a person has a legal right to engage in but which may 



be licensed for the purpose of regulation, or revenue, or both. In the 



latter case, the due process and equal protection clause of the Federal and 



State constitution must be given full force and effect, while in the former 



case they apply, if at all, to a very limited extent. I find no constitutional 



objections to the act in question with reference to such provisions of the 

 constitution. "143 



Somewhat the same difficulty in conceptual analysis has been 

 apparent in cases dealing with employment by some state or munici- 

 pal entity. In 1959 the court dismissed an action by an Aberdeen 

 policeman for pay he would have received but for a certain sus- 

 pension from duty which, he claimed, was visited upon him "without 

 cause and for political reasons. "i"*"^ There was no hearing to deter- 

 mine the truth of his claims. The court said: 



"Due process of law is not applicable unless one is being deprived of 

 something to which he has a right ... A police officer has no property 

 right in public employment which is protected by the due process clause 

 provisions in our State and Federal constitutions ... [A police officer has] 

 only the rights given to him by the legislation creating the civil service 

 system under which he is employed. "i"*^ 



Again, the same type question might be asked: What result 



142. 41 Wn. 2d 869, 252 P. 2d 259 (1953). 



143. Id. at 885; 252 P. 2d at 267. 



144. Yantsin V. Aberdeen, 54 Wn. 2d 787, 345 P. 2d 178 (1959) 



145. Id. at 788; 345 P. 2d at 179. 



