LEGAL ANALYSIS 113 



non-resident character of these persons. ^^^ 



In the Maryland situation, however, the resident-favoritism aspect 

 of the law was not effectively challenged; rather, in the case which 

 sought to do so, the decision went off on the basis that the persons 

 were validly prosecuted for violating a regulation forbidding the 

 use of purse seine nets by all persons, resident and nonresident alike, 

 and thus the nonresident exclusion was not necessary to sustain 

 the prosecution. This case, Corsa v. Tawes,^^^ is discussed earlier 

 in this report, in the section dealing with due process as developed 

 by the United States Supreme Court. 



In Alaska the statutory restriction on fishermen was again ex- 

 pressly in terms of favoring the in-state residents. The particular 

 provision permitted the administrators of the state salmon fishery 

 to close certain waters to all but resident salmon fishermen under 

 certain circumstances, in order to allow each resident to catch a 

 certain amount of fish before nonresidents were permitted to fish. 

 As the District Court quite properly decided under Toomer v. Wit- 

 sell, this provision clashed squarely with the provision of Article IV 

 of the federal constitution just referred to. In this case, Brown v. 

 Anderson,^^^ decided in 1962, the State of Alaska had argued that 

 its ownership of the fish permitted it to make such regulation as was 

 best for its residents, as the fish were their "common property." The 

 court said, however, "The ownership theory was put at rest, however, 

 in Toomer v. Wit sell . . ."^^^ and then quoted at length from the 

 opinion in that case. 



Only in Texas was the resident favoritism less apparent. In fact, 

 on the face of the legislation, it appeared solely as a matter of setting 

 a quota for the total number of licensees. Yet the scheme was so 

 inept as a direct means for effectuating conservation of the fish 

 resources and at the same time so obvious a matter of favoritism 

 for local persons to the exclusion of the nonresident, that it did 



167. See, for example, Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U. S. 415 (1952), where the court 

 invalidated a $50 license fee charged to nonresident commercial fishermen, upon 

 a showing that the resident fee was $5 and that the additional fee charged to the 

 nonresidents could not be justified, under the evidence produced, as being trace- 

 able to added cost of enforcement of fishing laws because of the nonresident 

 character of these fishermen. 



168. 149 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1957); aff'd. 355 U.S. 37 (1957), discussed 5//pr«, nn. 

 43-45. 



169. 202 F. Supp. 96 (D. Alaska 1962). 



170. /J. at 102. 



