LEGAL ANALYSIS 115 



wise utilization of the fisheries resources of these waters, the court 

 could not see that the means employed by the legislature were rea- 

 sonably in support of the declared purpose of conservation. 



While the decision might be thought perhaps a bit strict in 

 applying the rational means test under the due process clause, the 

 decision seems at least defensible on these grounds. Furthermore, as 

 suggested above, the legislative quota system had serious remaining 

 overtones of favoritism to the in-state resident. In the first place, 

 under the former highly discriminatory taxing scheme, nonresidents 

 had nearly completely been excluded. Of the 1,450 licenses out- 

 standing, only 6 were in the hands of nonresidents. Then, the new 

 legislation directed that the quota system start with those already 

 licensed, providing that they reapply during a four-month period 

 after the effective date of the new statute. Then, should there be 

 available licenses still remaining, priority was to be given to residents; 

 only after that did the statute provide that nonresidents could be 

 given licenses. As it happened, the court did not reach this aspect 

 of the statute as a basis for finding its invalidity. Had that aspect 

 effectively been put in issue and decision made thereon, it seems 

 highly likely that the Toomer decision would have led to in- 

 validation of the scheme as violative of Article IV of the federal 

 constitution. 



The restrictive licensing scheme under study in the present 

 project presents none of the undesirable characteristics of the scheme 

 employed by Texas. In the present scheme, for example, there is 

 substantial evidence, both of a biological and of an economic nature, 

 from which the legislature could with entire reasonableness conclude 

 that some scheme for restricting the number of participants in the 

 fishery was most needed. Furthermore, there is not the slightest in- 

 dication of any favoritism based on residence. Indeed, its only real 

 classification into any recognizable groups is that effected by a grand- 

 father clause. As has been pointed out earlier in this report, such 

 classification can legitimately be made, not just to avoid substantial 

 hardship to a substantial number of persons but also to avoid the 

 possible consequences of invalidity of the legislation for failure to 

 make such provision. 



Certainly the haphazard scheme employed by the Texas legislature 

 represents the opposite extreme from the background for the restric- 

 tive scheme under study by this project. Here, one can readily see 

 the thought given by well-informed persons, the years of careful 



