LEGAL ANALYSIS 117 



different considerations. The first of these^^^ dealt with the Land 

 Settlement Act of 1919^^^ which authorized the state to buy privately 

 owned lands, improve their habitability and productivity, and then 

 resell them. The court sustained the act, largely leaving to the legis- 

 lature the determination that such use of the tax funds was for a public 

 purpose, there being a reasonable basis for such determination. In 

 a 1959 case^^^ the court passed upon a taking of certain property 

 under an act granting eminent domain powers to port districts for 

 the redevelopment of substandard or marginal land. Here the court 

 fully reviewed the publicness of the use there involved, since the 

 applicable constitutional provision, unlike that pertaining to spending 

 of tax funds, required a judicial determination of public use. In this 

 latter case the court invalidated the particular application of the 

 statute, but the facts seem so strongly different from what might 

 reasonably be contemplated in a "buy-back" of fishing gear or licenses 

 that this latter case might well be distinguished. 



The California Supreme Court, on the other hand, has sustained 

 a "buy-back" of fishing gear of certain commercial fishermen who 

 were completely eliminated from certain waters of the state. ^^^ While 

 the constitutional provisions of California and Washington are not 

 identical, the general purpose of prohibiting the use of public funds 

 for private purposes in the sense of a gift is very similar in each of 

 the two constitutions. The California court readily found that the 

 legislature could have had valid purposes to be served by the appro- 

 priation of the public money for this purpose. 



In applying these cases to the problem at hand, it might be 

 crucial, incidentally, to make some distinction between a scheme 

 which forces the sale to the state and one which merely permits the 

 state to purchase from willing sellers, for the amendment to the 

 Washington constitution making it a court function to determine 

 the public use applies apparently only to the "taking" of property. 



Thus the legal aspect of the report in a sense leaves the work 

 only partially complete, for the study of details as they may be 

 formulated must yet be pursued. Similarly, the aspects of a "buy- 

 back" need further scrutiny, for the treatment given here is most 

 sketchy and intended primarily to indicate only the nature of the 



174. State ex rel. Reclamation Board v. Clausen. 1 10 Wash. 525, 188 Pac. 538 (1920), 



175. Laws of Washington 1919, c. 188. p. 583. 



176. Hogue V. Port of Seattle, 54 Wn. 2d 799, 341 P. 2d 171 (1959). 



177. Dittus V. Cranston, 53 Cal. 2d 284, 347 P. 2d 671 ( 1960). 



