298 BRAINS OF RATS AND MEN 



The ancient problems of the relations of phenomena 

 and noumena, form and substance, matter and en- 

 ergy, things and their properties, organs and their 

 functions, body and mind, are probably all of a piece. 

 The solution is not Hkely to come by way of further 

 deductive analysis of ancient formulas or any other 

 form of dialectic, but by more searching inquiry into 

 natural phenomena. 



If now we claim that in the present stage of sci- 

 entific advancement the simplest procedure is to re- 

 gard mind as we know it phenomenally as a function 

 of the body, a property of matter in motion, it should 

 be emphasized that this no more implies an objection- 

 able materialism than does the enumeration of any 

 other organs and their related functions. The philo- 

 sophical question is merely moved forward another 

 notch to the more general problem of the relation of 

 any object and its properties (Herrick, 1924, p. 302). 



Natural science has hitherto been content, for the 

 most part, to assume a stable material substance en- 

 dowed with properties which in the upshot are merely 

 the behavior of the matter. But further analysis of 

 the supposed ultimate unit of this matter, the atom, 

 has broken it up into smaller dynamic elements — 

 electrons — of which again we know nothing but their 

 properties, that is, their activities. It is true that the 

 masses of these electrons have been quite accurately 

 computed, but mass in its turn is only a name for a 

 behavior. And there seems to be a growing tendency 



