3o6 BRAINS OF RATS AND MEN 



2. On the other hand, that brand of na'ive materi- 

 alism which denies in effect the reality of mind or its 

 significance in nature is very popular in some scien- 

 tific circles. This negation of mind or its contemp- 

 tuous banishment into the outer darkness as an ir- 

 relevant epiphenomenon (which largely through the 

 vicious influence of Haeckel has come in the popular 

 mind to be regarded as the only true monism) also 

 rests on an acknowledged or implicit philosophical 

 basis. It is a thoroughly unscientific procedure, for to 

 any unprejudiced observer mind is a factor in many 

 biological situations which cannot be discarded with- 

 out removing something which is essential for a full 

 scientific analysis. The true solution of a scientific 

 problem is not facilitated by discarding the trouble- 

 some factors of the problem and attending only to 

 those which we know in advance will readily yield the 

 desired answer. 



These two favorite expedients of traditional phi- 

 losophy — "pure" idealism and naive materialism — 

 must, then, be laid to one side, for they do not satisfy 

 the scientific requirements of a true solution of the 

 body-mind question. To try to solve the problem of 

 the relation between these two things by denying the 

 reality of either is to fly in the face of both science 

 and common sense. 



The biologist, I repeat, is not interested in these 

 questions from the philosophic standpoint. He is not 

 concerned with ontological or epistemological prob- 



