336 BRAINS OF RATS AND MEN 



taristic purposes. On the contrary, since all mental 

 acts are functions of the nervous system, human pur- 

 pose and choice in view of probable future contin- 

 gencies are simply functions of a different sort of 

 nervous system from that tiny speck of nervous 

 matter which sets the direction of the insect's re- 

 flexes. 



The forward reference of reflex and instinctive be- 

 havior, its biological adaptiveness, is not in lower 

 animals so far as we know accompanied by any 

 "mentalistic something" that in our own experience 

 we identify as purpose. If we choose to give the name 

 purpose to any "toward-whichness" of behavior, as 

 Tolman (1924) does, this is a matter of definition of 

 terms which need not here be debated. We agree that 

 this type of animal behavior which persists until some 

 definite result is attained can be described adequately 

 for present scientific uses without any mentalistic 

 complications. But the purpose of which I am speak- 

 ing here is that sort of human behavior which is con- 

 sciously directed toward an end that is more or less 

 clearly formulated in mental terms. And I maintain 

 that when this awareness of ends to be sought is 

 present and is a component factor in a causal se- 

 quence of action it is not a negligible element in a 

 behavioristic account. And that it is present in some 

 of my own choices, I have direct evidence as a datum 

 of experience. 



This power of conscious choice in the light of prob- 



