SOURCES AND ENDS OF HUMAN EFFORT 337 



able future contingencies, again, has not grown up 

 out of nothing. It is an amplification of the "forward 

 reference" of those reflex and instinctive reactions al- 

 ready considered. The "end" which in the reflex is 

 attained blindly is here purposefully striven for. Even 

 in the simplest verbal symbolism the internal ap- 

 paratus of this forward reference is far more elabo- 

 rate (especially in its social implications) than in the 

 most complex instinctive or "native" behavior, as 

 Dewey (1922) and Mead (1925, p. 271) have shown. 

 The significance of this in behavior has been over- 

 looked in Hunter*s oversimplified schemata. 



My judgment of the probable course of future 

 events and my forecast of the probable consequences 

 of my own proposed action are determining factors 

 in shaping a decision or "making up my mind" to a 

 purposeful choice just as truly as are my hereditary 

 predispositions, my established habits, and my tem- 

 porary physiological condition of hunger, fatigue, de- 

 pression, or exuberance of vital tone — and they may 

 be by far the most significant factors. 



Every cortical process is a natural result of pre- 

 vious bodily activities. It is, in turn, a cause of subse- 

 quent bodily activities. This cortical process may or 

 may not be a conscious act. Its,^ antecedent causes 

 may be previous mental processes or events of simpler 

 physiological sorts; its results may be mental acts, 

 muscular movements, and events in the surrounding 

 physical world. If the cortical process is a mental act. 



