SOURCES AND ENDS OF HUMAN EFFORT 341 



as is ordinarily applied to other bodily functions. 

 That this subjective experience which I call "think- 

 ing and feeling" is congruous with the rest of nature 

 is not so evident, and this indeed has been the great 

 stumbling block in the entire history of the body- 

 mind problem. But there are numberless other in- 

 stances in natural science where the lack of apparent 

 congruity of phemonena is equally patent, though not 

 so disturbing. Indeed, we have only vague hints of 

 the underlying reasons why the chemical elements 

 exhibit their respective peculiar properties of color, 

 chemical affinity, melting point, etc.; yet we do not 

 doubt that they form a natural system. The fact that 

 this field is being rapidly clarified heartens us, though 

 it is a far cry to a successful outcome when we essay 

 to knit either life or mind into this same unitary sys- 

 tem. Vitalism and spiritism do not offer the most 

 promising approach to the problem. In this we agree 

 with the most thoroughgoing behaviorists. Of course, 

 this way of looking at life does not solve out of hand 

 all of the philosophical problems suggested by living. 

 But fortunately we do not have to await these solu- 

 tions in order to live happily and well, nor indeed in 

 order to develop a very serviceable science of the 

 vital processes. 



Wheeler (1923) has endeavored to show that objec- 

 tive behavior and introspective experience are not as 

 disparate as is commonly assumed. ''Introspection 

 does not differ in kind from other methods of scientific 



