SOURCES AND ENDS OF HUMAN EFFORT 343 



perience and that this experience is a controlling fac- 

 tor in my behavior. 



Lashley in the work cited (p. 272) has endeavored 

 to show "that as complete an account of the attri- 

 butes of consciousness can be given in behavioristic 

 terms as can be given in subjective terms as a result 



of introspective study The statement, T am 



conscious/ does not mean anything more than the 

 statement that 'such and such physiological processes 

 are going on within me/ " He here attempts an im- 

 possible enterprise. Even if our account of the physi- 

 ological processes were perfect and complete objec- 

 tively, the subjective experience remains a real fact of 

 natural history, not an epiphenomenon or a by- 

 product. There are no by-products in nature. Wheth- 

 er a given product is of value in a particular context 

 is another question. And there are many contexts 

 where consciousness does matter. 



When Lashley says in a later passage (p. 336), 

 "The reactions are awareness,*' he appears to be stat- 

 ing exactly my own position and that of Professor 

 Warren and other advocates of functional and double- 

 aspect theories. But the appearance is quickly de- 

 stroyed when he adds, "The complexes of reaction 

 meet the subjective description of the organization of 

 consciousness, and leave over no undescribed psychic 

 elements." If any possible account of objective be- 

 havior does "meet the subjective description" of con- 

 sciousness, then the description of that consciousness 



